Political Economic Analysis On Purchase Restrictions Of China’s Real Estate

Real estate is a kind of special commodity with the dual attributes of consumption and investment, related many industries and downstream products, and its development is directly related to economic growth and social harmony.The Chinese government began to carry out macro-control of the real estate market since 1994, and the introduction of more intensive control measures are used from 2005 to now. But the price is more stressed the more up.In the case of the control measures are not effectively to stabilize housing prices, in April 2010 the central government issued a real estate purchase policy.However, due to various reasons, the effect is not satisfactory, and the policy quit the purchase restrictions in September 2014 in most cities. Although the purchase of the policy has been basically quit, but extraordinary measures adopted in this extraordinary period, has become an extremely rare typical case study of government and market relations. The introduction and implementation of this policy, as well as the exit process of political economic analysis, not only can deepen the understanding of the formation and evolution of the policy, deepen the understanding of the relationship between government and market, but also can provide a theoretical basis and reference for the improvement of the government to improve the real estate.Research on the purchase of the policy, scholars focused on the legality of this policy, the effectiveness and the expected time frame for implementation of the three aspects.I have not been able retrieved the introduction of restriction policy about itsimplementation, quit research process and its benefits behind the relationship. This paper uses interest groups, public choice, game theory and econometrics methods addressed, the introduction of Chinese real estate purchase of the policy, implementation, exit process and institutional analysis and rational choice of related interests, contact the real estate market operation of different stages of the purchase policy, in-depth study of the central government, local governments, real estate developers and investment property buyers strategy choice and their interests balance.Comprehensive survey of the real estate purchase of the policy and its implementation effect of political and economic factors, the emphasis on the interests of the differences and contradictions of different stakeholders analysis, using game theory to analyze the restriction policy, different strategies to select the main implementation and exit process interest, highlighting the perspective of political economics paper.This paper studies the regulation of real estate prices at home and abroad, and its combing emphasis was focused on domestic purchase of the policy research scholar scholarly literature, and has conducted an objective evaluation. Based on relevant research literature depth study, so I determined to take political economics perspective as this article, and research focusing on the purchase of the policy behind the interest analysis.This paper analyzes the necessity of government regulation and control of real estate market from the failure of the real estate market, and according to the purpose of the government regulation of the real estate market, this paper discusses the key points of real estate regulation and the main policy measures.On the basis of this, the paper mainly discusses the function mechanism of the restriction policy and its restriction condition, which provides the theoretical support for the following research.Over the past decade, China’s real estate prices showed a rapid rising trend in general, in order to curb housing prices rising, the central government issued a series of control measures, but did not bear fruit. By 2010 a new round of housing prices rose rapidly, not only seriously affected the financial entities and economic security, but also caused the majority of low-income earners discontent. In this context, for the central government to ensure national economic security and access to public support considerations, even local government is expected to respond to the policy conditions, the central government chose different strategies to weigh costs and benefits, and carry out the introduction of restriction policy decisions. Although the purchase of the policy will affect the revenue of local governments, but the central government determines the promotion and appointment of local officials, local governments can only choose to support.At the stage of restriction policy implementation, in terms of interest in the study, there are two level games: the central government and local government; local governments and real estate developers and investment buyers. Under serious asymmetry in information, multiple tasks required and the rational allocation of resources practical constraints, taking into account the high dependence on local government finance land, the central government chose not to strictly supervise the implementation of the purchase of local government policy; under the conditions of this selection, local governments maximize the benefits policy response is certainly not strictly enforced. Local governments do not strictly enforce the restriction policy, which means no strict supervision of developers and investment buyers to comply with the purchase, this way, the latter two stakeholders in the interest of maximizing principles, would choose "not strictly observed ".Game strategy equilibrium of the two levels formed by the three stakeholders, determines the local government, developers and investment buyers as much as possible to avoid the implementation of or compliance with the purchase policy, through the "conspiracy", illegal ways to reduce its loss of profits.Game Equilibrium of the purchase policy implementation phase determines the purchase of the policy implementation effect. In this paper, the data of seventy cities in January 2009 to December 2014 real estate prices and the panel data of the respective dummies and economic variables from the model using double differential restriction policy of price effects of our country were fixed effects regression analysis random effects regression analysis, regression test Hausman test and at different time points. Restriction of early in the implementation of the policy to stabilize prices did play a role, but in the latter has exacerbated the rise in real estate prices.Exit Game of restriction policy takes place between the central government and local governments. First, local governments are forced by financial pressure and have to put pressure on the central government by the exit of a tentative approach. And the central government’s basic cost-benefit trade-offs continue to be prohibited. Until June 2014, the real estate market situation reversed, prices trend a substantial decline, and the downward trend apparent. Acquiescence of the central government allowed local governments to exit restriction policy. From June 2014 to September 2014, most of the purchase of real estate purchase from the city except Beijing, Shanghai,Guangzhou,Shenzhen and Sanya.In the introduction to the restriction policy, implementation, exit procedures and the relationship between the interests behind the game based on the analysis, our deep reflection on the restriction policy to maintain the stability of real estate prices and promote the healthy development of the real estate industry, we must adhere to market-oriented reforms direction, changing administrative requirements suppression-oriented regulatory policies to reform land finance and build multi-level housing security of the system as the focus, rationalize the relationship between the government and the real estate market.According to the reflection conclusion, the paper finally discusses the problems and countermeasures of the real estate market in china.