Resarch On Retailer’s Channel Choice And Collaborative Strategy Under The Electronic Commerce Environment

With the rapid development of electronic commerce, on the one hand, more and more traditional offline retailers began to consider whether to set up online channels or when to open it more appropriate. On the other hand, for the dual-channel retailers, they need to consider how to integrate their online and offline channels to obtain higher returns. The retailers are how to make reasonable channel selection and effective synergism, which are not only own originality and innovation in theory, but also have very important application value. In this paper, we use game theory, consumer utility theory and the relevant theories of supply chain management and adopt the method of mathematical modeling and numerical simulation to study these issues. The main research contents are as follows:(1)We mainly investigate the retailer’s channel structure choice. That is, whether and when a retailer should adopt an online channel only, an offline channel only, or dual channels. Using a two-echelon supply chain model, we identify the range of customer acceptance of online channel for each of those three possible channel structures to be optimal. Furthermore, we study how the retailer’s channel structure change impacts the profits of the manufacturer and the supply chain. We find that when a pure online or offline retailer adopts dual channels, the supply chain always benefits. However, when a pure offline retailer adopts dual channels, the manufacturer may suffer and thus disallow the retailer selling online. To solve this potential conflict, we propose that the retailer pay a fee to obtain manufacturer authorization to achieve win-win outcomes. Lastly, we design a sales rebate and penalty contract which can coordinate the supply chain.(2)We mainly investigate the dual-channel retailer’s price decisions. We use the Nash and Stackelberg game to examine the optimal decisions for such dual-channel supply chain under three kinds of power structures:balance power between the retailer and manufacturer, retailer-leader and manufacturer-leader, and obtain the equilibrium solutions of prices. We then compare the equilibrium prices and profits under the three kinds of power structures. Lastly, to further understand the impact of the market environment and product cost on the prices and profits, we use analytical and numerical studies to carry on sensitivity analysis.(3)We mainly investigate whether the "preorder-online, pickup-in-store" (POPU) strategy can be always benefit to improve a dual-channel retailer’s profits or market share? If not, when the retailer should adopt this strategy? To answer these questions, we study under the two cases:monopoly case and competition case. Under monopoly case, we first study the retailer’s optimal prices decisions under the POPU and non-POPU strategy. We then find that the POPU strategy is not benefit to the retailer by comparing his profits and market share between the two strategies. Under competition case, we study a supply chain in which the dual-channel retailer competes with a pure e-retailer. We first derive the equilibrium prices under the POPU and non-POPU strategy. We then compare the dual-channel retailer’s optimal profits and demand between the two strategies. Subsequently, we find that when the value of the product is medium and the transaction costs of offline channel is high, the dual-channel retailer can adopt the POPU strategy to improve his market share. If the degree of customer acceptance of the online channel is also high simultaneously, the dual-channel retailer can further improve his profits by using the POPU strategy.(4)We mainly investigate whether the transshipment strategy can be always benefit to the dual-channel retailer? To answer this question, we study under the two cases:retailer’s centralized decision and online and offline departments’decentralized decision. Under the centralized decision, we first study the impact of transshipment cost and competitive intensity on transshipment strategy choice. We then study the validity of transshipment strategy. Under the decentralized decision, we first investigate the transshipment price decision. We then study the impact of transshipment cost, competitive intensity and transshipment price on transshipment strategy choice. We find that regardless of centralization or decentralization, the transshipment strategy is better when competition is more weaker. In additional, under the decentralized decision case, the transshipment strategy is more attractive than that under the centralized decision case.