Research On Kant's Theory Of Freedom

Kant's discussion about freedom is generally conducted in the realm of Humanity, which contains the tension between man and God, and the tension becomes the essential starting point when we examine Kant's theory of freedom. The freedom we usually talk about is generally human freedom. However, man is a special being that can be summarized as a limited being to his very nature. What are the limits of these limited beings? Needless to say, man is the combination of spirit and flesh. On one hand, he has spirit; on the other hand, man is a physical existence. The key to the problem is that the two definitions haven't reached the substantive unification in man, so man carries the two different provisions in a split way. Logically speaking, the thing that is displayed in the form of the two contradicted provisions is an intellectual product. As far as individual being is concerned, man is different from the mere physical existence, and also different from the purely spiritual being. Therefore, in logic he is neither a simple intuitive thing, nor is it a purely rational thing, but the intellectual being. Simple intuitive things do not have the possibility of pursuing freedom since its spiritual provision has been submerged in its physicality. Purely rational things are freedom itself since they have dissolved their own flesh. Therefore, only man asks for freedom. On one hand, man has the possibility of pursing freedom; on the other hand, man is not freedom itself. From the perspective of human nature, the realization of his freedom needs a metaphysical dimension. This dimension is manifested everywhere in Kant's doctrine of freedom in the realm of Humanity. This is the o(?)ought of freedom as a logically consistent thing which is rendered as a system. This system is just corresponding to the three categories of Modal category table of speculative reason:the possibility, the reality and the necessity of freedom. Under the lead of the three categories, the thought of freedom covers the cognitive, the practical, as well as the aesthetic or teleological fields, which is the concrete embodiment of Kant's thought of freedom in his famous three critiques. In this way, the pedigree of freedom is established, and such an approach keeps a correspondence with his architecture. In speculative reason, the top of cognitive activities is the influence of the highest principles upon the things in experience, which is reserved for the possibility of practical activities. This possibility, once transformed into practice, will require to break through its purely ideological provisions so as to be manifested in real things. Practical activities result from the establishment of Subject itself in Object. Thus, practical activities will be related to materials and be realized in a realistic manner, hence the possibility of freedom will be implemented. However, the representation of both Subject and Object in its realistic manner depends on the absolute purpose, which grows into the necessity of freedom. This issue has been discussed in Critique of Practical Reason under the topic of suspension of "the absolute good", and the fundamental discussion of the issue is in the "reflective judgment" doctrine. The metaphysical nature of freedom is revealed there. However, Kant hasn't entrusted the necessity of freedom to metaphysics in an objective manner, but it boils down to human scrutiny activities (judgment), which is the overall end-result of Kant's freedom doctrine.This article is divided into three parts according to the above idea. The first part probes into the embodiment of freedom in theoretical reason, that is, the establishment of prior freedom. The prior freedom is displayed in the third antinomy in Cosmology Idea. Cosmology Idea is dealt with in the same with the soul theory and prior theology, which are all based on the confusion of the subjective and objective applications of reason, that is, to turn a purely conceptual thing (subjective conditionality on experience) into a thing with objective reality in experience (objective limit on experience). The solution to the confusion is to maintain the prior conceptuality of concepts of reason, so as to make it play a role of subjective guidance on experience. The generation of prior freedom is also based on the misuse of reason, which regards the connection between freedom and necessity as objective. According to the common solution to prior dialectics, we should maintain the conceptuality of freedom. However, Kant thought that the objective connection between freedom and necessity is possible. Freedom and necessity can work alongside with each other in the same Subject, thus the real connection. This is the uniqueness prior freedom in the four antinomies, and even in the whole prior dialectics. In the final analysis, Kant's freedom is man's freedom. Man is a the product of intellect who has the dimensions of both freedom and necessity. However, in the proof of the thesis of the third antinomy, Kant examined freedom by the law of sufficient reason, which regards freedom as a form of God, while in the third antinomy he once again put it into the realm of humanity. The two different orientations in the proof and resolution of prior freedom prove the essential correlation between humanity and theology at the start point of freedom. Since prior freedom constitutes the culmination of cognitive activity, it actually has become the starting point of practice, so it is only the possibility of freedom. This possibility and the freedom of practice are the two sides of freedom hosted by the same Subject. Kant's freedom in his moral philosophy is nothing more than the results achieved by the purification of the possibility of self-driven freedom. The key lies in the change of attitude. If the same reason is displayed in a practical way (even the pure practical way), the possibility becomes the things of reality.The second part examines the realization of the possibility of freedom. Practical reason deals with the relationship between reason and desiring abilities, so it legislates for Will, while the ontological basis of moral law is freedom. Although the innate basis of our practice is prior freedom, in theoretical reason it hasn't been shown in a practical way, so it needs deduction in practice. The deduction is performed in Principles of Moral Metaphysics. Through the deduction, the standards of behavior will have an objective foundation, which shows that freedom can't be realized in a cognitive way, but it can be realized in a practical way. Freedom and innate moral law are the two sides of one thing, so the implementation process of freedom is the standard of behavior being obedient to the moral law, which reflects a principle of virtue. Simply from this perspective, freedom is still abstract, because it only takes into account the form of practical behavior, which is bound to be manifested by man as ontology (or rational beings) in accordance with the requirements of reason. It doesn't care about the phenomenon of man. Man's phenomenon level is the things pursued by man's low-level desires which are called happiness by Kant. Strictly speaking, only this level is consistent with virtual principles, and the reality of freedom can be implemented. Therefore, the highest object of pure practical reason is not purely a virtue, but the unity of virtue and happiness, that is, Kant's "the absolute good". The absolute good is the real manifestation of freedom's realization, which shows that freedom is not only a possible thing, but also a real thing. Reality is the unity of essence and phenomenon, that is, necessity. This unity leads to the three suspensions of the "absolute good", and these suspensions constitute the external guarantee of the realization freedom. From here, the problem of the freedom's necessity has been derived. The real discussion on this problem is manifested in the theory of teleology (broad teleology, not the narrow teleology aimed at man).The third part explores the manifestation of absolute freedom in the way of answering aims, and this part is in fact the real content composed by Kant on metaphysics. In accordance with Kant's ideas, I divided it into two sides:formal teleology and material (content) teleology. The former side emphasizes the aesthetic feelings inside of man, highlighting non-purposes'conformity to purposes; while the latter focuses on the analysis of subjective nature's system which is confirmative to purposes and on its ultimate purpose, and the system highlights the metaphysical meaning of the moral teleology of prior humanity from the concepts of organism. Aesthetic activities expand freedom to the necessity of freedom, that is the freedom's conformity with law or non-purposes'conformity to purposes, which highlights the ultimate purpose of things through perceptual appearance. The organism's internal conformity to purposes manifest the great power of the Creator through its own development and change. The above content is discussed in a more direct way in those suspensions of moral philosophy, and those suspensions guarantee the realization of freedom. Kant tries to create a connection between limited things and absolute aim via imagination, and method he used displayed the uniqueness of his way used in dealing with metaphysics. Nevertheless, Kant's ideas about metaphysics (absolute aim or absolute freedom) are still shown in the activities of judgment, and his judgment is still man's examination. That is to say, his metaphysics is still in the realm of humanity. If Kant's reflective judgment (intuitive reason) is regarded as objective, it is very similar to the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.