A "pure" Experience How Could That Be? - Husserl's Phenomenology Extended Study Of The Experience The Problem

When we say Husserl is a rationalist, we are quite right, only if that we notice that this is not a complete comprehension of Husserl. Because there is another important dimension in Husserl's phenomenology, that is phenomenological experience. Because of this dimension Phenomenology differs from the traditional rationalism and affords the openness, thus making phenomenology possible to transform to modern philosophy. In this paper I mainly pay attention to Phenomenological experience, and conduct a research regarding some key problems, especially through a series of contrasts between Husserl and certain other thinkers. My purpose is to unfold the special position of phenomenological experience in philosophy.Unlike Locke's extrinsic experiences, which are stimulated by exterior or internal sensory organs, Hume's experience is intrinsic experience presented by subjective psychology. Thus this experience has strong phenomenological implications. But from the point of Husserl's Phenomenology, Hume's experience is still external to our transcendental consciousness. Husserl's phenomenological experience should be a kind of immanent and intentional one, well-founded and transcendental in our consciousness. This experience has something related to the subject's function of construction. We can also say that Kant's philosophy shows some phenomenological meaning, especially in his Critique of Judgment. For him the aesthetic experience is constructed by our subjects, not stimulated by passive incitement, so this experience is similar to phenomenological experience. Hegel also pays much attention to experience in his (Phenomenology of spirit. Therefore, Hegelian experience is not produced by passive incitement either. In a certain sense Hegelian philosophy also has its phenomenology.We can find that there is full consideration of experience in Husserl's philosophy, whether in his early career or later period. For example he pays attention to perception and intuition, brings forward the views of internal time- consciousness and life-world, and requests the logic to return to pre-predication experience to find its validity. The two standpoints, empiricism and idealism, which seems incapable of fusing together, exist in the phenomenology at the same time. This makes phenomenology lie in the tension between empiricism and idealism.But at the same time, Husserl makes effort to put the experience and idea together, and wants to get certain transition from experience to idea or from idea to experience. Certainly we can say that experience is subjective, and the idea is objective. Thus regardless how Husserl opposes the dialectics, there would be a lowest dialectic between the experiential subjectivism and idealistic objectivism. This specially shows itself in his trying to let transcendental logic get its validity by returning back to pre-predication experience. Husserl thinks that the way of getting the transition from experience to idea is by essential intuition, not by dialectics. However Derrida thinks dialectics exist in the phenomenological system with no doubt. Husserl does not use intuition in transforming from experience to the idea in fact, but carries out the leap by looking for some mediums, and such mediums should have both the characteristics of experience and idea. Derrida concludes that Husserl's whole effort is to try to find these mediums. But though the mediums ,the principle in transforming from experience to the idea is not essential intuition ,but by repetition, that is metaphysics of presence. But Hume's problem makes the transformation through mediums impossible.The phenomenology has seen tremendous development after Husserl, and phenomenoiogicalscholars emphasize more on experience problem. Nonetheless, although their "experience" is also construct by subject's active or passive actions, there still lies certain difference between the two kinds of phenomenological experience. Husserl thinks that each phenomenological experience contains its horizon, and each horizon is fringe and mist...