| This thesis studies non-competitive equilibrium and institutional change at stock market in China.It is claimed that stock market unequilibrium in China is essentially non-competitive equilibrium,in which non-market factors and non-competition factors extremely influence activities of stock market. Non-competitive and non-market factors create non-market return,which distorts market signal. Based on this claim,the hypothesis of institution-correction equilibrium is developed. It is built up through combining theories of freely competitive equilibrium,government intervention equilibrium and equilibrium of institution supply and demand. And it emphasizes links between institutions and competition and seeks balance of institution and competition.Based on hypothesis of institution-correction equilibrium,this thesis analyzes unequilibrium of stock market in China as following:First,by discussing adverse selection and moral hazard in stock market,this thesis emphasizes the importance of institutional design in turning of non-competitive equilibrium of stock market into institution-correction equilibrium (the third chapter).Second,by applying econometrics and statistics to the study of signal assimilation efficiency and allocation efficiency of capital factors,this thesis discloses the unequilibrium features of stock market in China. This analysis produces two results:as far as market mechanism is concerned,stock market in China has stepped into the zone of weak form efficient market since 1994;as far as listed companies are concerned,the worsening performance of listed companies after listing indicates that stock market does not create continuous increase in productive efficiency and hence weakens stock market's function of optimizing resource allocation (the fifth chapter).Third,this thesis tries to explain why non-competitive equilibrium and non-competitive return exist by institutional economics and suggests that indefinite capital ownership and dual structure of stock market are the institutional basis of non-competitive equilibrium and non-competitive return. The negotiation transfer of state owned stock and legal person owned stock,which can not be traded in stock market,and the transfer of corporate control are main methods for market manipulator to seek super non-market return. And the existence of non-competitive return distorts signal at stock market,which results in inefficient allocation of capital factors (the sixth chapter).Fourth,applying approach of public choice and game theory at an angle of institutional arrangement and institutional change,this thesis analyzes the root of non-competitive equilibrium at stock market in China. It is indicated that institution and its change are endogenous variables influencing institution-correction equilibrium and they also are a process of collective decision,which the government makes by playing game against market participants (the seventh chapter).Supported by the theoretical analysis,the last two chapters suggest policies which help achieve strong form efficient market. Since institution unequilibrium is caused by institutional change,we need to find efficient way and workable path via institutional arrangement,which includes designing the path of institutional change andconcrete institutional arrangement,to carry out institution-correct equilibrium and strong form efficient market. The eighth chapter indicates that we make use of forced institutional change and induced institutional change simultaneously but with different focuses:forced institutional change is used to broke path dependence and to provide appropriate institutional environment for induced institutional change;and induced institutional change to enhance marketization of our stock market. After the path of institutional change is fixed,the ninth chapter makes some specific practical suggestions to improve institutional arrangements and correct institutional failure at stock market in China.Innovations in this thesis include:First,by combining freely competitive equil...
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