Ownership Structure And Corporate Governance Of Listed Companies

Firstly the thesis regards the stock right structure of the listed company of GreatBritain and America as the research object and has a detail analysis on thecharacteristics of the shareholding structure as well as its movements. Then we studythe factors in the course of its formation from the angle of the historical, political and law. Based on the deep research on the relationship between the shareholdingstructure and the governance model, the thesis explains the basic reason of thegovernance model in Britain and America, which is mainly supervised from theoutside and evaluates its effectiveness. Although there is no theory of the bestgovernance model, Britain and America choose the corresponding model. So it is thebest one for them. Along with the study of the stock right structure of Great Britain and America,the paper extends to the stock right structure of the domestic listed company, andexplores the related problems from a new view. The author believes that theshareholding structure is not the natural choice of the economic development, but theresult under the guiding ideology that realizing institution innovating and raisingmoney without losing the controlling of the stated-owned economy. So, besides thepresent model, the security market has other choices not only from the basic principlebut also from the technology. Under the background of underdevelopment, the specialinstitutions of limited company, security market put forward the dividing up of theshareholding structure of the domestic listed company. Because of the powerfulstated-owned economy and the repelling of the non-stated-owned economy, there aremainly state-owned corporations in the security market, what's more, and there aremainly the stated-owned shares in the ownership. The basic reason of the complicatedorganization structure is the way that the corporation is founded. The complicatedshareholding and organization structure exacerbate the unsymmetrical degree, raisethe exchange cost and lower the resources allocation efficiency. What's more thecomplicated organization structure promotes the difficulty of supervising. The cuttingapart of the shareholding structure divides the investor's interests. Different interests subjects and groups have different behaviors, for example, the big shareholder's underground behavior and the minority's free-ride behavior. Stock issuing system getting planned to cause listed company" shell" rareness of resource, High premiumissue stocks improve company line up listing enthusiasm. " one alone heavy" itself isnot " misfortune water", listed company" one alone heavy" offer possibility for theminority stock holder's rights and interests in the big shareholder encroaches on. Theincomplete supervising institution makes it possible. In the end the thesis has deep study about the stock right structure, thegovernance model and the performance. Against the now available research methodsand results on the relationship between the shareholding structure and the governance,the author views the problems from a new angle and draw a conclusion that therelationship is non-linear. We try to analysis the listed company with the quota of theratio of correlated transaction. The positive analysis indicates that the ratio ofcorrelated transaction is closely related to the control pattern but there has no proofthat the control pattern has relation to the performance. So the control pattern isrelated to the governance. The paper put forward a new view to analysis the problem with the catalog of thecontrol type, and the relationships among the control type, the corporate governanceand the performance. The research is a hard job and my ability is limited, there mustbe some limitations of the essay. I should study deeper for some fields and gain moreachievements.