Governance Structure And Corporate Performance: An Empirical Study Of The Ultimate Control Of The Two Different Companies,

This article discusses corporate governance in the framework of Principle Agency theory.On the basis of classification of the final controlling right of corporate, the article studies two main issues: what differences and similarities about corporate governance do private and state-owned listed companies have? What differences and similarities about the effect of corporate governance on its performance do two kinds of companies have? Theoretical and empirical studies show that:First, comparative analysis of two kinds of sample corporate indicates: private corporate possesses higher return of core assets. We think its key competitiveness is better than state-owned corporate. ROE has no significant difference between them. In respect of equity ownership structure, state-owned corporate has higher concentration of shareholding and lower liquid shareholding. In respect of corporate governance, board size of private corporate is less than state-owned corporate, which means private corporate has higher governance efficient and manage ability. Both kinds of corporate are facing the problem of performance declining. Second, as supervision measure is being perfected constantly, corporate governance of listed company is sound progressively. For example, we introduce independent director and construct incentive and constraint mechanism. However, regression analysis indicates that effect of corporate governance on its performance is weak. Specifically, only manager's salary has positive correlation with corporate performance in both kinds of company. Board and supervisors' size, president and manager as a one person or not has no significant correlation with corporate performance. Managerial' shareholding has no significant correlation with performance in private corporate while it is negative in state-owned corporate. Independent director doesn't improve performance as expected, on contrast, which bring negative affect on performance in both kinds of company. Third, the effect of equity ownership on performance isinconsistent in two kinds of companies. There is an unsignificant U curve relationship between performance and the largest shareholder's shareholding in private corporate. The former fifth shareholder's Shareholding has remarkable positive effect on corporate performance, which means organization shareholder can play a role in promoting the performance in private company. In state-owned company, there is a remarkable averse U curve relationship between performance and the largest shareholder's shareholding. The former fifth shareholder's shareholding has no significant effect on corporate performance. After distinguishing ownership, state-own share, legal-person share and liquid share has no obviously effect on its performance. Forth, debt is unfavorable to performance. It differs from high leverage brings high performance in foreign countries. We think it is because debt restriction is soft yet in our country. Corporate size has little correlation with CROA, which indicates that size has no relationship with key competitiveness.Based on above research, we propose some advices to enhance corporate governance and finally , to improve corporate performance and its key competitiveness. The advices include to make all shares liquid, enforce?law supervision, feed manager markets, enforce bank affect on corporate governance and soon.