Ownership And Corporate Governance Mechanisms Studied

For the concept of corporate governance, the economists have not got identical opinion. When they talk about the content and function of corporate governance, there are two opposite perspectives: shareholder-value perspective and stakeholder- society perspective. Stockholder-value perspective holds that the core of corporate governance is how to protect stockholder's interests. Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Stakeholder-society perspective thinks that corporate governance relates not only to the conflict between top management and equity. Stakeholder-society in one corporation should include the employees, creditors, high and middle management, firm-specific suppliers or buyers, the public and the government. In fact, corporate governance is a dynamic concept, which will change with the change of corporate system. I think corporate governance should be a series of systems on how to protect all investors' interest. Of course, we should also notice that the corporate governance is a state-contingent ownership.We can know the importance of corporate governance through researching the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance, corporate governance and capital market development, corporate governance and economic growth.There are two approaches to research corporate governance mechanism. One is to discuss the effect of corporate governance in theoretical point of view. The other is to testify the effect of corporate governance in real economy through substantial evidence. In 1997,relative laws have gradually been used to research how to protect investor interest. The concept of corporate governance has been developed and extended. Now, there have been many researches for corporate governance in China and abroad. But there are litter literature systematically focusing on corporate governance from enterprise ownership view. The ownership can affect the way and the effect of corporate governance mechanism. The research for corporate governance under different ownership structure will be useful not only for the reform of state-owned enterprises but also for the improvement of corporate governance for non-state-owned enterprises in China. It's the main motive and meaning for me to write this paper.There are seven chapters in the paper.The first chapter will mainly describe the concept and importance of corporate governance. In whole paper, I will discuss corporate governance from different ownership aspects, including dispersion and concentration of ownership, the nature of ownership, transition economy and China's state-owned enterprises.In second chapter, I will probe into corporate governance from contract theory and agency theory. To some extent, corporate governance structure is a practical arrangement of ownership in corporate theory. For modern enterprises, separation of ownership and control is one outstanding characteristic, which brings about interest conflicts between finance and management. The way to solve these conflicts is tokeep matching of residual claim and residual rights of control.The structure and nature of ownership will affect corporate governance mechanism and enterprise performance. In 1932, Berle and Means had researched the ownership, enterprise performance and corporate governance. In 1976, Jeasen and Meckling had researched the separation of ownership and control and the relationship between enterprise value and manager ownership. These are two most important literatures in early stage. Due to some restrictions, there is no direct positive relationship between ownership structure and performance in real economy.In third chapter, I will discuss corporate governance under dispersed ownership. The various approaches of corporate governance mechanism under dispersed ownership include the manager incentive contract, the supervision from the board of director, the restriction of financial structure and the market of corporate control...