Research On The Mechanism Of Corporate Governance And Performance

In the process that State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) transform into modern enterprise system, and with the extension of sovereign rights for enterprises and its operators, the phenomena of insider control and operator corruption increase greatly, which lead to great loss of State-Owned Assets, heavy augmentation of operation risks and negative operation performance. The effective corporate governance is urgently requested. Therefore, to comply with the deepening reform of SOE, the establishment of new mechanism of corporate governance to restrict the behavior of the operators is a very urgent and practically meaningful research project for the guarantee of improvement of the corporate performance.Basing on the backgrounds of the SOE's transforming into modern enterprise system and striding across the several courses such as management, economics and sociology and basing on the study of basic theories and the contrast of the home and abroad models of corporate governance, the paper brings up the concept of comprehensive governance through the internal and external mechanism. It analyzes the substitution relationship between the internal and the external mechanism, which specifically points out that the deployment of controlling rights through the stock market, is not only the knit but also the foundation between the two kinds of corporate mechanism. Thus it can replenish the insufficiency of excessive stress on the internal corporate governance while ignoring the importance of the external corporate governance.In the past few years, there is a breakthrough that the target of corporate governance has been changed from the supervision and restriction on the operators to the guarantee of scientifically making decision and the improvement of the performance for the corporate. Hence, the concretely designed relationship between the mechanism of corporate governance and the corporate performance is a heat point for the research.To integrate the two aspects above, the dissertation positively studies on the relationship between the mechanism of corporate governance and the corporate performance, in the meantime, countermeasures are brought up to perfect the listed companies in our country.The contents of the dissertation specifically include as follow:The first part, Research On the Basic Theory of Corporate Governance. First, the paper expounds the relative basic theories involved with the corporate governance. On this foundation, it builds a general framework model for the corporate governance. Then, different target models of corporate governance home and abroad are compared. Encircling the core issue of corporate governance, the paper proceeds from the model of reciprocal system of stock market in China; it divides the mechanism of corporate governance into internal and external parts.The second part, Research On the Relationship Between the Internal Mechanism of Corporate Governance and Performance. First the thesis positively analyzes the relationship between the internal mechanism of the listed corporate governance and its performance. The results make clear that the abnormal equity structure basing on the non-circulation state-owned equity as the foremost stockholders is the main reason for the ineffective corporate governance for the listed companies in China; The introduction of legal stockholders and reduction of the percentage of state-owned equity are the effective decision to solve the problem of deficient position of state-owners. Then the research results on the independency of the board of director show that it importantly contributes to the improvement of the efficiency of corporate governance and performance. In accordance with the reality of the enterprises in China, we propose a program for the perfection of regulation for independent directors in China. Finally, through the theoretical and positive research on the relationship between the rewarding motivation to the managers in Chinese companies and the corporate performance, the paper presents the non-symmetry issue of rewards and contr...