The Studyies Of The Institutions Of Water Rights Transactions

The core of the innovations about water resources collocation institutions is the reformation of water rights institutions, while establishing the institutions of water rights transactions is the core of the reformation of water rights institutions. Now, the studies of solving the conflict between supply and demand of water resources in China are very exigent. With have gone deeply into the marketization reformation, a series of typically worth investigation cases of the innovations of water rights institutions have appeared in China. Therefore, based on the case studies in China' water rights transactions; this paper studies the water rights transactions institutions.Based on the analysis of "dispositional system of water" in the Black River valley, this paper demonstrates that the initial collocation of regional water rights depends on the constraint from the upper governments, instead of market mechanisms in China. The initial collocation of regional water rights often lies on the upper governments' preferences, and must be put teeth in. If the initial water rights were defined clearly and definitely, water rights transactions will appear. Then the efficiency of water rights collocation is increased. Maybe the mechanism named "decides by self to administer" can be applied to the arrangements of regional water rights institutions. But it still depends on the area of the region or river valley. Perhaps it does need neither the government restrictions nor market mechanisms in small regions or river valleys, but it must rely on mainly government restrictions in large regions or river valleys.Based on the analysis of water rights transactions between Dongyang City and Yiwu City, this article proves the conclusion that the reformation and evolution of water rights transactions institutions in China belongs to the pattern named "middle mould blossoming", which is impulsed by the regional government. In other words, the innovations of water rights institutions are subject to the reformation pattern which is impulsed by the regional government. It is because of water rightstransactions between governments is similarly an optimal choice according to existing restrictions. Under the blurry property rights, water rights transactions aren't independence of promotion by the governments. But water rights transactions between two regional governments chiefly are drawn by the demand.Based on the comparison analysis of the reformation of water rights institutions between Hongshui River Irrigated Area and Liyuan River Irrigated Area in Zhangye City which is the first experimental unit of the frugal driving to save water in China, this paper shows the water rights transactions between two entities who use water are based on the suppose that water rights are distinct and stable. It is needed to reduce the transaction cost by the institution design which makes buyer and seller get better. From a potential revenue of water rights transactions perspective, water rights transactions trend to existing among industries and between the cities and countries, instead of resting among farmers. In order to break through current and temporary water rights transactions, the time of allotting water rights must be lengthened and the agency organizations of water rights transactions must be promoted.Based on the comparison analysis of between water pollution rights transactions in Minhang District of Shanghai City and the water pollution rights sale with consideration in Xiuzhou District of Jiaxing City Zhejiang Province, this paper proves the conclusion that under control of the gross sum and distinct water rights, the price of water rights transactions can be analogized by the price of water pollution rights transactions, instead of the government's intervention. Even initial price is zero, even initial price deviates from the equilibrium price. Market mechanisms can lead to the emergence of equilibrium price. On the contrary, the government restrictions against both number and price of pollution rights prevent market mechanisms from op...