Study On The Commercial Insurance Regulation In China

Insurance regulation is an important problem as same as finance regulation, social insurance and economic development. But the insurance regulation polices in China are emulating methods and experience of developed countries to a large degree, lack of close association with local economics, culture and mentality, which lead high indirect cost, especially unobvious opportunity cost, and low regulation efficiency. Low regulation efficiency will further lead to the raise of regulation cost. Foreign insurance regulation theory and experience indicate that regulation logical is developed from non-regulation stage more concerned with efficiency to over-regulation stage more concerned with safety first, toward a random stage concerned with both. However, insurance regulation in China still stays in the second stage, paying less attention to regulation cost and efficiency.Due to the fact that the control of indirect regulation cost conflict with the goal of safety and stability in China, insurance regulation cost and benefit is less concerned. Furthermore, efficiency of insurance regulation, on market behaviors and investment is hardly focused. Therefore, several problems are conducted in this paper theoretically, such as balance analysis of insurance regulation cost and benefit, game theory analysis of insurance market behavior, welfare function analysis of the dilemma from investment restriction.Statistical analysis on insurance market indexes in China shows that domestic market is life insurance dominant, unexpectedly, correlation-ship between health insurance and premium investment and deposit is high and accident insurance is less important as that showed in most study, and that overall expense is highly correlatedwith property insurance compensation. Monopoly overwhelms insurance innovation; therefore, it should be strengthened to protect new products. As the classification of insurance practice, insurance regulation will be more difficult. Under the condition of the imperfect of institutional function, access regulation should be enhanced while practice style regulation should be lessened. The structure of human resource is seriously unbalanced caused by the defect of intermediary supervision policy, so access to similar industry should be limited. The regulation of EB should be enhanced in field of fairness and conform, information publication, business standard, corporation and communication. Policy suggestion is proposed in the paper on above fields.Finally, a set of appraise index system with object layer, field layer and index layer is built, and a concept model of comprehensive appraise index number for China's insurance regulation.