Economic Analysis On Scenery Resource Property Rights

On the basis of asymmetric information in principal-agent model, the paper proposes and confirms that assigning scenery resources' rights and responsibilities to both public and private entities can improve resources management efficiency. The work integrates property right-theory and contract theory. The model and the nummerical simulations indicate that we can offer a resource conservation contract so as to ensure that the multiple public as well as private objectives of resources management are achieved. They also make clear that the public regulator can choose to retain specific types of imformation to decide the authorization degree according resources value and protection costs. Therefore, the paper consists of three sections including six chapters. Section 1 confirms that the private production of scenery resource goods is possible. In this section, we will also fix the key variables of conservation contract design. Section 2 specifies the model, carries out numerical simulations and analyzes the key facts that affect the contract efficiency. Section 3 explains and analyzes some cases with section 2' s conclusion, make out some policy advices to improve resource management efficiency. The main content of the whole paper is structured as follows:Section 1 includes chapter 1, chapter 2,chapter 3 and chapter 4. Chapter 1 is the leadin, introduces the debate between tour pursuers and menagement section on the private management of scenery resource. Chapter 2 analyzes tour services and scenery resource protection that natural scenic site privades. On the basis of the theory on the private production of public goods, we can say that the private production of tour goods in natural scenic sites is imaginable. Chapter 3 indicates that the private production of tour goods in natural scenic sites is real because the management institution and the law do not forbid do so. Chapter 4 analyzes the property right structure related to the production of tour goods,...