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Tax Collection Under The Conditions Of Asymmetric Information To Study

Posted on:2006-06-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H F LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2206360152488134Subject:Public Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Lacking the theoretical direction is one of the issues of the reform of tax administration in our country. This limits promotion of the reform and innovation of the system to a certain extent. This thesis basing on Asymmetric-Information Theory, has announced various kinds of asymmetric information existing in tax administration, and then has put forward the corresponding settlement measures. The purpose lies in trying to solve the problem that in tax administration with Asymmetric-Information Theory and realize the optimization of tax administration.Asymmetric information is a situation in which one side of an economic relationship has better information than the other. There are four models in Asymmetric-Information Theory: adverse selection, screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Principal-Agent model refer to any kinds of asymmetric-information relationship. The informed party is called agent and the other is called principal.Because of the existence of uncertain, system defect and poor information system, there are lots of asymmetric information in tax collection. In general, asymmetric information in tax collection has between the following subject: government, tax authority, tax staff and taxpayer. From government to the tax authority, from tax authority to tax staff, there is a principal-agent chain, and then the Asymmetric-Information Theory may apply tax collection too. The Asymmetric information has caused the taxpayer's reverse selection and tax staffs morals hazard, affected the process of the tax system reform, caused the poor efficiency of the tax revenue and forfeiture of neutral principle of tax revenue to a certain extent.According to the reasons of the asymmetric information in tax collection, basing on the actual conditions of our country, this thesis has put forward four pointed measures: incentive contract, tax legislation, the ability that taxpayers obtain the information of the tax revenue, the construction of information system .To start with, incentive contract is how to avoid the taxpayer's reverse selection and tax staffs morals hazard; Perfecting the tax legislation and improving the ability thattaxpayers obtain the information of the tax revenue, the purpose lies in reducing the information asymmetry about the tax laws and regulations between them. The fourth respect is to accelerate the construction of information system, including tax bureau's information system construction and the information system of the whole society.
Keywords/Search Tags:Asymmetric-information, Tax administration, Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Incentive contract
PDF Full Text Request
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