The Economic Analysis Of Listed Company Regulation

Since the beginning of the 21st century, in the emerging Chinese stock market as well as in the American stock market, listed companies have produced numerous scandals. In such a context, there comes a global tendency of strict stock monitoring. China is especially the case.Theoretically the strict monitoring for listed companies is based on such a supposition that the slack monitoring results in problems in listed companies. This dissertation intends not to decide whether this supposition is scientifically sound, but to work out how to achieve the proper monitoring in the course of strict monitoring, that is, how to make the monitoring of listed companies more efficient, so as to make the monitoring of listed companies free from problems and too much burden on monitoring cost (including legislation cost, execution cost, law-keeping cost, morality cost, renting cost and opportunity cost etc.) This dissertation attempts to have a systematic analysis on the monitoring activity of Chinese listed companies with the employment of the strategies in system economics including the analysis of game, systematic balance of supply and demand and cost benefits etc.The analysis of the monitoring of Chinese listed companies through game aims at making clear why the monitoring of listed companies is needed, or whether the monitoring can prevent listed companies from problems. The answer is yes through the analysis in the former four chapters, especially the game analysis in Chapter Four. In other words, theoretically, the following two suppositions can hold water: one is monitoring of listed companies can be regarded as a game relationship between stock monitoring administration and listed companies. The other is stock monitoring administration and listed companies are considered to be an economic entity seeking for the maximized function. So it's quite probable for the game balance between the two, i.e., monitoring and law-keeping. Though presently Chinese monitoring of listedcompanies are not efficient at all, it is a achievable goal through monitoring to prevent listed companies from breaking the law. From the viewpoint of system economics, the monitoring of listed companies is a systematic arrangement. It is by nature a relationship of system supply and demand. This makes the adoption of systematic balance of supply and demand in the analysis of the monitoring of Chinese listed companies possible. The so-called slack monitoring can be regarded as insufficient systematic supply on one hand and the failure of systematic supply to practical need in monitoring on the other hand. The insufficient systematic supply, in terms of the number of systems, suggests that many monitoring systems, laws and policies which should be set up and bettered have not been really set up and bettered, or not applied to practice. The failure of systematic supply to practical need, in terms of the quality of systems, indicates that the set-up or carried-out monitoring systems do not have or have little feasibility in practice. In any case, it is a question of supply and demand in monitoring system by nature. Thus, to seek a proper monitoring system for listed companies to better the monitoring efficiency needs the analysis of the relationship between supply and demand of monitoring system of listed companies. With the analysis in Chapter 5, such a balance between supply and demand of monitoring system can be achieved. On the other hand, the present monitoring of Chinese listed companies is far from such a balance. The so-called jam in stock market is the good case in point. That is, on one hand, many IPO enterprises audited through the Committee of Issuance Auditing are waiting for the issuance. On the other hand, when there is great stock of enterprises issued in stock market, the stock index will be decreasing.However, the dissertation neither starts from nor ends at the analysis of the supply and demand of monitoring system for listed companies. The key point is the efficiency of monitoring. Furthermore, the efficiency of monitoring of listed companies, from the viewpoint of economics, is a comparison between cost and benefits. So this dissertation goes on to analyze the monitoring cost and benefits...