| The object regulated by antirust law is mainly an firm's behavior, so it is a kind of economic phenomenon at first and then a kind of legal phenomenon, which is unable to be regulated scientifically before the property of an firm's behavior as an economic phenomenon and its normative meaning are understood clearly. Otherwise the subject of antitrust law can degenerate and even be weakened, and the basic idea and the pursuit of value of antitrust law can be confused, and even the function of antitrust law can be lost completely.This was confirmed in early antitrust legislation and justice practice of America. It is just the important reason why the United States used economic analysis in antitrust law. Antitrust law doesn't regulate all the firm's behavior but that which has anticompetitive effect such as damaging the freedom of competition and the economic efficiency. From this point, the central objective of the paper is to provide a fundamental analytical frame and tool for antitrust legislation and justice by analyzing an firm's behavior economically.This dissertation was based on the law economic analysis of antitrust, and investigates mainly the substantial content of antitrust law, and concentrates chiefly on some basic theoretical problems such as the objectives of value,the pattern of regulation,the principle of regulation,and the object of regulation of antitrust law from an angle of theory and empiricism, and normativism and positivism of economics, and discusses economic theories and justice practice about antitrust law in new economic fields.The dissertation includes six chapters.The first chapter discusses first the central value objective of antitrust law namely the establishment,development and normative function ofeconomic efficiency objective.It thinks economic efficiency is an inevitable effect under the discipline of rules and follows rational choice , which is how to achieve the maximization of profit under the discipline of given resource scarcity,industry relation and institute for an firm. What it will resolve is how to make an firm run by means of facilitating the maximization of social welfare for antitrust law. So the chief value objective of antitrust is economic efficiency. And economic efficiency has a very strong normative function. It can provide identifiable standard between goodness and viciousness of monopoly and avoid confused situation that is brought to monopoly legislation and enforcement by non-efficiency standard. In addition, it can strengthen the transparency and expectation of antitrust law. So most countries established economic efficiency as the basic or central objective of antitrust law.Secondly, the dissertation analyses the connotation of economic efficiency and its mechanism for realization deeply and systematically, and thinks economic efficiency is divided into static efficiency and dynamic efficiency from the basic dimension. Static efficiency actually refers to the state of resource allocation realized under the condition of competitive equilibrium and the optimal state of Paroto, which reflects the optimal allocation of production resources among different regions, different industries and different enterprises of all industries. But dynamic efficiency refers to the proper investing levels in all kinds of innovations, the speed of introducing new products and production process improvement of current products. From the point of realization mechanism static efficiency comes true by complete competition, and the realization of dynamic efficiency depends on the feature of different industries and market conditions, and emphasizes dynamic competition and efficient competition and isn't restricted by a set of conditions hypothesized by complete competitiontheory. From a long term, technical advance is more advantageous to improving consumer welfare than the efforts whose aim is to eliminate the inefficiency of production and allocation brought about by monopolistic pricing. Besides, it is production efficiency, firm efficiency, technical efficiency or x-efficiency to make production resources used effectively in an firm and achieves the maximization of output. However, resource allocation efficiency and production efficiency are two different concepts. The former emphasizes that resources are used in the best opptunities or the most valuable ways, and focuses on the reasonable allocation of resources among all industries, firms or individuals in society and doesn't request the maximum of production output. And the later emphasizes that the output is made economically under the same condition of resource and technology. So resource allocation efficiency is an important condition of high production efficiency, but it itself isn't high production efficiency, and high production efficiency isn't like resource allocation efficiency.The three kinds of efficiency concepts above are built on the base of the new classical theory of firm .This theory holds that an firm is a "black box" and as long as something is input into it ,the output will be produced. This theory neglects transaction costs, So it can't explain the existence and border of an firm. Therefore, I discuss the role of transaction efficiency on transaction organization form and the policy implication characterized by antitrust law.Static efficiency provides an ideal standard for antitrust law and dynamic efficiency resolves the problem of dynamic mechanism of continuous maximization of social welfare. Therefore, a certain balance must be sought in the implement of antitrust law. Meanwhile, we need comparative analysis of resource allocation efficiency, production and transaction efficiency and use compensatory efficiency means to determinethe influence of an firm's behavior on welfare affect.The second chapter discusses the economic implication of monopoly comprehensively and systematically, and defines it legally and puts forward new categories of monopoly. I point out that monopoly is an behavior to impair competition or economic efficiency by firms, economic organaizations or administrative institutes. From view of origins of monopoly, monopoly is classified by natural monopoly, prevelige monopoly and economic monopoly. The prevelige monopoly is classified by national monopoly, administrative monopoly and intellectual property monolopoly. From view of the content of monopoly, monopoly is classified by structural monopoly and behavioral monopoly, structural monopoly includes structural monopoly origined from natural process and structural monopoly origining from non-natural process, behavioral monopoly includes structural monopolistic behavior and behavioral monopoly behavivor. I outline regulatory objects of antitrust law under efficiency standard. With regards to natural monopoly, it can be structurally exempted due to its economic and technical rationality, but its monopolistic behavior should be regulated. National monopoly and intellectual property monopoly should generally be exempted, but the misusing of intellestual property should be regulatory object of antitrust law. Administrative monopoly should naturally be regulated, due to its non-rationality in all aspects, structural monopoly origined from natural process should not be regulated, but behavioral monopoly is regulatory object of antitrust law.The third chapter of the dissertation makes a comparative analysis of static efficiency and dynamic efficiency under the different conditions of market structure, and makes an expirical analysis of the relationship between market structure and performance before putting forward the regulatory pattern and principle of antitrust law.Generally, static efficiency is high under the ideal condition of complete competitive market and low under the condition of incomplete competitive market, which is chiefly embodied in the social cost of monopoly. It includes the dead-weight of social welfare created by monopolistic pricing, X-inefficiency caused by monopoly, resource loss created thanks to consumers choosing substitute pruducts and efficiency loss caused by the rent-seeking of monopoly. However, nothing is absolute. Excessive competition can take place under the condition of complete competition the way excessive competition can lead to lower efficiency of resource allocation and the social wastes and even weaken innovative incentives. On the contrary, there will be the efficiency of scale economy and scope economy under the condition of incomplete competition and certain firm's scope is a necessary condition for innovative competition. A monopolistic profit is innovative dynamy innovative as well as innovative capacity.An empirical analysis indicates that there are remarkable positive corelations between market structure and market performance. Although analysis paradigm of structure-conduct-performance has been critictized by efficiency scholarship, the standpoint isn't tenable that market structure can't create the effects of market power. The right direction should be that market structure has efficiency effects as well as market power effects. A established market is an outcome of the long coaction of industrial attributes, market scope, technical attributes and firm's conduct. From this point established market structures limit an firm's conduct and profit, but market structures aren't given. They are just elements which an firm wish to control and make it become own dominance. Material capital, R&D and marketing investment are all means by which an firm alters its own market status and market structure. Among these some investing conducts may be from theneeds of normal competition, but other investing conducts'aim is to achieve monopoly or plot monopolization illegally. It needs considering many factors which clearly include market structure, the welfare effect of conduct or the impact on efficient competitive conditions and economic efficiency. So it isn't scientific and tenable logically to outline the regulating pattern of antitrust law in the regulating pattern of behaviorism or structurism.This chapter proposes regulating pattern namely efficiently competitive pattern based on the former two parts and the adjustment of current international industry structure and the degree of firms participating in international competition and the rise of new economy. Its aim is to achieve the optimum combination of scale efficiency and competition energy and seek the balance between innovative incentives and capacities. A natural conclusion is that the regulating principle of antitrust law should be built on the goal of economic efficiency and the regulating pattern of efficient competition.The fourth Chapter is a natural logical extension of the former chapters. This chapter discusses chiefly the substantive systems of Anti-trust, including obtaining, maintaining and misusing dominant status. The first section analyses collusive behaviors especially tacit collusive behaviors from the angle of law and economics. This section involves in the factors such as collusive features, types and restrictive factors, empirical analysis of collusive behaviors, and regulatory law policy for collusive behavior. The second section focuses on merger types, merger incentives and merger welfare effects, and merger regulatory procedure and regulatory approache. The third section examines predatory pricing. This section describes two theoretic models of predatory pricing, and concludes that the classical predatory pricing is very seldom, and that it has difficulties in distinguishing other predatory pricing from normal competitive conduct. Therefore, somestandards are needed to define predatory pricing, including average variable - cost approach, selective approach and average cost and selectivity approach. However, these approaches are limited in defining predatory pricing. We claim that the institute of antitrust enforcement should carefully select standards for predatory pricing under specific case. The fourth section analyses vertical restrictions from the point of law and economics. This section synthesizes the alternate candidate theories for explaining why firms would use these restrictions to promote competitive ends. Vertical restrictions in contracts between manufactures and their retailers represent natural applications of the theory of contracts under principal — agent relationships. Economic efficiency is best served. If this set of restrictions is accorded symmetrical anti-trust treatment, particularly if these restraints are judged according to rule of reason or per se legality standards. In order to prevent externalities from distorting the retailers' incentives to achieve the proper balance, Resale Price maintenance is an instrument used by manufactures to elicit the appropriate balance between price and service levels by the retailers. Positive effects from exclusive dealing such as enhanced incentives for dealer to supply non—price services, or better control and lower distribution costs and so on, in fact reinforce efficiency enhancement. The possible explanations for tied sale are plentiful, from price discrimination to effective restrictive retailer control to the prevention of excessive consumer sorting to input control. A careful examination of the facts of each case is required to assess the relevancy of the candidate theories, and then they are selected to apply to each case.The fifth chapter focuses on anti-trust issues about law and economics in new economy. The first section defines new economy, and its features, and then analyses mainly anti-trust problems from new economy. In contrast to old economy, the products of new economy are mostly intellectualproducts that are characterized by hinger-fixed costs and lower marginal cost, complement, compatibility, network externality and so on. On the one hand the features of new economy make high-tech industries take the Schumpeterian and Creative -Destroy and dynamic competitive process, on the other hand, it makes easily market a monopolistic market, and anti-trust enforcement face to mainly technical problems. The second section analysizes the policy of access and its application in new economy. I point out that antitrust enforecement should sufficiently consider relevant market conditions and technical conditions, if they enforce mandatory access policy. The third section discusses how anti-trust law to apply to new economy, including merger regulation, standard -setting regulation, and regulation for market power misused by dominant firms. This section concludes that new economy's features could not make new economy exempt from anti-trust law, and that the anti-trust enforcements in new economy are distinct to old economy's, The forth section emphasizes that the innovative incentives and innovative pressure are very important in new economy. While intellectual properties provide protection for innovative rents for innovators, and enhance innovative incentives, excessive protection for innovators reinforces strongens monopolistic market, and discourages future innovations, and ultimately impairs social welfares or consumer welfares. It is required to balance between intellectual property law and anti-trust law.Under findings of all the former chapters and sections, the sixth chapter proposes that economic efficiency should be foundmental value objective of antitrust law in china, that Chinese antitrust-law's regulatory pattern should be effectively competitive pattern, and that Chinese antitrust-law's regulatory principle should be rule of reason. Antitrust law should regulate natural monopoly, national monopoly and administrative monopoly.
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