Dworkin And The Interpretive Theory Of Law

Any general legal theory must answer the important questions of what law is and what a theory of law should be. These crucial questions are firmly related. It is remarkable that the methodology of legal theory has not come to the forefront of legal theory until the Hart/Dworkin debate. This article seeks to address that topic by laying bare the basic structure of the debate.The question of what law is can be changed into the question of what the grounds of the propositions of law are. Both Hart and Dworkin explore this question. Legal positivist say that theoretical disagreement is an illusion, that layers and judges all agree about the grounds of law. They think the concept of law is a criteria concept and suppose that we can argue sensibly with another if we all accept and follow the same factual criteria.The criteria concept of law cannot account for the theoretical disagreement. So we must reject it .We believe that law is an interpretive concept instead of a criteria concept.Since law is an interpretive concept. Lawyers try to show practice in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practices as they find it and the beset justification of the practice. Then they frame truth condition for propositions of law. A successful legal theory should take the constructive interpretation. The legal theorists should take up the internal, participants' point of view instead of external point of view.Hart argued for a descriptive jurisprudence. Dworkin rejects the possibility of a descriptive jurisprudence. We believe that legal theorists should assign value and purpose to the legal practice. So, jurisprudence is not descriptive but normativeWe attempt to set out the basic subject matter of the debate. The debate is organized around two most profound issues, namely, the relation between legality and morality and the relation between legal theory and morality. Theorists must take the participants' point of view and give a constructive account of creative interpretation. Jurisprudence must be normative in character.