Chinese State-owned Enterprises The Right To The Agency Relationship Study

China's State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which were newly born and have been growing up together with the Republic can be regarded as a creation in China's development history, and they play a crucial role during the ancient China's transformation from agricultural to industrial civilization.China's State-Owned Enterprises cohere the industriousness and achievements of laborers of several generations.When the Soviet Union's ones stepped into ruins owing to privatization in the 1990s, China's SOEs also developed into the period of highlighting the social contradictions. Reform has to be done, but in which direction and in which way should it be? How to assure the laborers' possession of properties created by themselves, how to ensure the reform's socialism orientation and let them moving towards the high-level forms?Reviewing the development of China's SOEs, the core of their problems is whom they own to, they are in the charge of and their benefits are shared by. This relates the entire SOEs' ownership rights system, involving a full set of principal-agent relationships from ownship to rights of possession, use and benefits.The SOEs'tortuous development experienced a series of reforms, from the decentralization of power and transfer of profits, the contracted responsibility system to the modern enterprise system. However, all the laborers, that is, the real owners of SOEs, still have not realized their control over the enterprises. Problems such as vacancy of ownership bodies, vagueness of permission boundaries between state institutions, boards of directors and the management, the insider control, erosion of the state assets, SOEs' underperformation and their heavy losses haven't been fundamentally resolved in despite of the multiple stratification and complication of SOEs'principal-agent chain.The root of the problem lies in that the owners have not really take the ownership. Historically the state power bodies took the control of the state assets as revolutionists represented by the Communist Party of China established the New China. The laborers became the owners of SOEs only for that they were endowed with such rights of the state, based on which we can safely say that China's SOEs ownership was formed reversely.In the development of SOEs, their principal-agent relationships were mainly focused on the ones between the government and enterprises, which their reforms were also implemented around. Meanwhile the great extent owners were disregarded aside and their rights to ownership of individual labor and production materials never truly realized. Accompanied with this, SOEs' ownship degenerately transferred from laborers to government and all the laborers' rights to ownership became weakened step by step.In order to realize the laborers' fundenmantal intrests, SOEs' reforms have to be taken actively, which should still uphold the socialism orientation and whose key points lie in the realization of the laborers' rights to ownership of individual labor as well as production materials, the perfection of the laborers' control over public institutions which fully in charge of SOEs'management through democracy and legal systems and the straightening out of SOEs' principal-agent relationship, so as to refelect the laborers' wills and to protect theirs rights. Only during the process of strengthening their principal-agent relationships, can China's SOEs develop and expand healthily, overcoming the system disadvantages, and can the advantages of public ownership truly come out.The main method that the thesis had taken is studying the relationship between all objects, first analyzing the concept of ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise by using relationship method from the Angle of economic contradiction. Analyze on the relationship between ownership, management right, right of possession and principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise, defined the principal contradiction, and the methods of solution are provided. Second, emphasize the Entity principle. The method of social science has entity, that is to say, different researcher studies according the benefit from different angles by different method. All the social problems should be dealt with appropriately concerned People-oriented, solved in the contradiction System-level Analysis. Ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise is an economy issue which had gathered all political, culture, social, diplomatic factors.etl. This article from the perspective of economy on the issue, besides, political, culture, law factors have been considered in the analyzing. Four, this paper combines the deductive method with the empirical studies researching the contradiction of ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise. The method strives for scientific, accurate and reliable.The Opinions Explains in this text as follows:first, the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise is an issue including whether the worker as the entity of society consisted, whether socialist public economy developed soundly, reform and opening-up policy, Economic development, Society Harmonious from the angle of Chinese political economy-labor socialistMust Taking the Views of uphold the socialist system, safeguarding the socialist public ownership, the construction of rich and harmonious society and overall Participation international competition and cooperation to learn the contradiction of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise. The principal contradiction of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise is the contradiction between ownership and possession right. Regulators of state-owned enterprise only has the right to possess the property, now is offside to exercise of rights of ownership. Therefore, the labor whom has the ownership has been imperfection of the real right. second, the contradiction of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise was formed at the stage of Economic reform, and developed transformation to a market, so its very necessary to explain the proceed. To solve the problems of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise, Above all is to establish the entity of state-owned enterprise. On the basis of labor power belonged to the labors, definite the ownership of state-owned enterprise by citizen. Then condition the behavior of exercise the power of management right, right of possession, establish new right system. Four, the key to reform the relationship of the ownership, management right, right of possession and Principal-Agent Relations of China's state-owned enterprise is to interfere with the supervision democracy and according to law. Democratic supervision is the right that the labors to supervise the state-owned enterprise, democratic rights form legislative powers, Should adhere legislative to the restrain of judicial power and right of perform. Supervision of the state-owned enterprise lawfully is the behavior that to protect the ownership and democracy of the labor. This is the rule and the implementation of the enterprise right system with state-owned enterprise as the leading role.