Study On Stockholders Equilibrium Management With Asymmetric Information

Stockholders equilibrium management with asymmetric information is researched in the dissertation. The key point is that stockholders need to find the equilibrium on supervisory costs, incentive costs, surplus loss and the total agency costs trade-off for maxmizing their wealth. The study has two kinds of perspective, one from adverse selection with asymmetric information, another one from supervisory institution.The optimal choice on information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off with adverse selection by improved information structures is researched. Compared with prior beliefs about agent-type distribution, the equilibrium decision with Bayesian posterior beliefs is presented. As a result, the signal of unquestioned quality is good for reducing the information distance between principal and agent, and improving the contract. Finally, the constraint of signal procurement costs budget is described.The improvement on information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off with adverse selection under two kinds of auditing is researched. First, the information rent extraction and allocation efficiency can be improved through auditing, it is different from the second-best contract, but the auditing cost constrains principal to use widely, the optimal audition proving probability is depending on auditing cost and its benefit. Second, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium under mixed-strategy audition game is unique, the mixed-strategy audition can put information rent extraction to zero, but auditing costs must be paid and allocation efficiency is lost, it is different from the second-best contract in allocation efficiency change, and it is positive linear to the optimal cheating probability of agent.The Nash equilibrium implementing uniqueness of contract with nonverifiable agent types is researched. Based on Nash equilibrium in the signals space, the contract and the agent type is connected, then the uniqueness of Nash implementation on the first-best contract and the second-best contract is researched. As a result, the second-best contract can be Nash implemented uniquely in nonverifiable agent types, but the first-best contract can't be done.The corporate governance problems in Chinese Listed State-owned Enterprise are researched from institutional perspective, such as the corporate governance supervisory system, independent director system, voting mechanisms, etc. With the new reforming environment of domestic capital market, some proposals for the supervisory system in Chinese listed SOE have been provided. In the end, for an example, the securities company developping policy in efficiency is represented.