Analysis On Principal-Agent Of Corporate-System Enterprises Under Asymmetric Information

The condition for the present of the economic crisis in the world, the problem of the risk prevention and the maximize shareowner value in economic activities were more respected by people. In order to pursue the maximization of economic benefits, a modern variety of economic theory and technology were actively and proactively explored and used by people. Under the practical needs to incentive, game theory has already developed into the most advanced analysis tools of the microeconomics. In this paper, we use the asymmetric information model of the principal-agent theory, and also based on the results of modern research, quantitative analysis of the main factors, which impacted principal-agent's results, and incoming of the different risk preferences condition between clients and agents, also given the corresponding results and policy recommendations.The relationships of Principal-agent were the earliest formed in the West. Form the beginning of the 19th century, with the increasingly competing of the market competition and the continuous development of the production socialization, the scale of the enterprise development were more and more larger than before, the form of the Corporate shareholders were more and more diversification, the business enterprise of the management were more and more pluralism, diversity and scientific. The ability of the agents request more and more higher than before in the enterprises, The past by'The major shareholder of the corporate enterprises'or'family house in family business'as the business agent approach has already adapted to the new situation. For this, the unity of ownership and management of the'business enterprise'evolution for the separated of the rights in the'operator-controlled enterprise', that is the main types of the modern enterprise, with the'principal-agent'. In the 19th century, this kind of enterprise initiation in the railway companies of the United States, at 20th century, it has already become the standards of corporate form of business in western countries. Business owners, that is the principal, from the own needs of economic interests, to give up the direct control of enterprises, only property the business property of the final title and principalship, but let the right of actual control in the enterprises entrusted to the managers, who was by their own choosing. Its essence is title and the right to operate separated, the agent to replace the client, to acquire control the right of the business, In modern economics, the principal-agent relationship is seen as a contract. At home and abroad, the application and research of the principal-agent theory are always wide attention and positive thinking by many scholars. That can be seen, the principal-agent theory is not only the main forms of enterprises, and also the combination of key issues, which we study the theory and practical application. As the principal - agent relationship is related to the problem of asymmetric information, so the most difficult problems of the principal-agent relationship are the most important, the most basic, and also the most difficult in modern economics. On the basis of reading and researching the principal-agent model at home and abroad extensively and in-depth, combining the characteristics of Chinese enterprises and Chinese economic and the employment status, some new ideas of the current principal-agent relationship are given in this paper. These research results are of great theoretical significance and practical value on both the development mode of our enterprises and the promotion of the steady and healthy development of Chinese economic.In the preamble of this paper, introduced the context of the article and topics of significance, this will help us understanding of the article's the purpose of selection and writing significance.Chapter one is the summary of principal-agent relationship. It mainly introduces the current situation of the project at home and abroad, the achievable on theory, the relation between clients and agents, the connotation of contactless, and the basic hypothesis on client-agent model on the condition of asymmetrical information. In order to make the content completely and clearly, chapter one primarily introduces the research achievement at home and abroad. These materials supply me with the writing foundation and valuable ideas as well as the theory foundation and reference of this essay. In the second place, it introduces the relationship between clients and agents and the connotation of contract. We give a explicit description on the relationship between clients and agents and adequate explanation on the connotation of contract. Finally, we offer necessary presumption on the basic situation of the clients and agents.Chapter two and three are mainly based on the basic assumptions of the first chapter, On the combination of different risk preferences respectively, design the principal-agent relationship model between shareholders and corporate managers and between enterprise manager , management and scientific and technical personnel。And come to the main factors influencing the output of the principal - agent are agent's output coefficient, the cost of efforts, market random factors and the extent of clients and agents risk preferences。Then analysis these parameters quantitatively, and finally arrive at enlightenment respectively.Chapter four is chiefly the conclusion of chapter two and chapter three. In the first part we sum up five conclusions. The first conclusion is that in the talent market, if there is no sever contrast among the candidates'expected salary,we are able to select excellent personnel by the way of comparing and interview again and again. The second conclusion is that the corporation should reduce the agents'cost in the progress of management. The third one is that the larger the market uncertainty (the random factor of the market) of the product is, the higher the risk -avoidance the corporation's agent take. On the other way around, the lower the risk they share. The fourth conclusion is the different attitudes towards the risk of the corporation's agents play an important influence on clients'profit. The fifth conclusion is the profit of the company's manager is unsymmetrical. The second part has given the currently economic situation of the Principal-agent relationships about four points of the new ideas. First, I try to establish the better information disclosure mechanism; Second, to take a different incentives for all categories of personnel; Third, concerned about the uncertainty of the market impact of the enterprise; Final, effective control over executives pay.In the concluding part, mainly talk about the recalling of the entire and defects in the article summary, as well as the prospects for the directions of the future research.