The Study Of The Government Action For Public-private Co-operation Project

The emergence of public-private partnership financing model may solve the shortage of funds and management inefficiencies for the government in infrastructure building; through the government's macro-management and operation, we can achieve effective supply of infrastructure with less financial resources. Through the study of government behavior, we can develop a scientific and reasonable subsidy model, achieving an effective incentive and restraint in the infrastructure supply, reducing the public's financial burden. In public-private partnership model, the government is no longer directly involved in the operation of quasi-public infrastructure projects, and just acts as the "referee" in investment and construction and the maker of the game rules; and by regulating the behaviors of project investors we can improve enterprise management and efficiency, establish a market-centered multi-directional decision-making mechanism, a multi-dimensional mutual restraint and balance system, so that the goal of positive externalities and public welfare of infrastructure can be realized as soon as possible.The theoretical basis for public-private partnership is the pricing theory of welfare economics. Starting from study of the pricing theory, namely strong natural monopoly products pricing, the average cost pricing, marginal cost pricing, and public goods pricing theory without control of a state, we research the feasibility that government provide public goods subsidies for the public-private partnership project and introduce the efficiency parameters. Through analysis of the conditions of government subsidies, we find that so long as subsidies meet the conditions that is (4-26) and (4-29), the financial subsidies can lead to social welfare increasing for the Quasi-public project.In fact whatever form do we supply subsidy with for co-operation projects, the efficiency distortion of government always appear. By improving our system we can only achieve the efficiency minimum distortion, so we realize the goal that increases efficiency of the government subsidies.The economics effectiveness and game theory are adopted to analyze the effectiveness that government provides subsidies. By contrasting the policy cost with transaction cost, we put forward the advice that government should pay attention to issues in the process of government subsidies. We use multi-objective decision theory to study the relation between the subsidy scale for public-private partnership and the franchise year and simulate the example for the decision-making mechanism.We study the irregularities of private investors in course of financial subsidies and applicate the indefinite game theory, repeated games to research risk of financial subsidies, we find that violation motivation of the investor become less if the greater the punishment of the government for violator and the greater the probability of speculative be found is. The better the reputation for the investors is, the more motivated do the investors have to maintain the reputation; however the violation frequency of investor without reputation is the greatest among investors. The Government has to increase the penalties for speculative investors, on the other hand government should strengthen the building of the system to strengthen the investment risk control.Speculative risk is due to the existence of information asymmetry and investment complexity, each of public and private has interest and aspiration oneself, the pursuit of the most interests of private investors is the premise of the existence of speculative behavior, in order to effectively reduce the speculative existence and to achieve win-win-win with the public, private and public parties in the process of cooperation we should establish a long-term trust mechanism and rational alliance contributions and compensation mechanisms and the improving mechanism of contracts and project risk control and construction monitoring mechanism in the pre-post, so we will effectively reduce the private investor speculation.Drawing on relevant research theory, we establish the structure equation governmental action affecting the structure of project performance, based on research data and structural equation model we educe impact effects that governmental action affect the performance of the project, namely governmental action can not only directly affect the performance of the project but also can indirectly affect the performance of cooperative projects by influencing the investment climate and the degree of trust. At last the policy recommendations are proposed to improve government action.