The Study Of The Pricing And Incentive Of Large-Scale Dredging Engineering Based On Principal-agent Theory

The dredging engineering is an interdisciplinary subject, involving in numerous complicated problems such as ocean, rivers, ship technology, environmental protection, economy and management. The cost of the dredging engineering not only concerns the profit and development of the dredging enterprise, but also concerns the developing dynamics and positivity of the owner. In a sense the cost of the dredging engineering determines the operating cost of the whole national economy. Therefore, the dredging engineering is always the important project for the research and practice of multiple scholars and business circles.Analyze the cost composition of the dredging engineering and the factors of influencing the cost and profit of the dredging engineering, and apply the entrusted agency theory to analyze the entrustment relationship during the dredging engineering management. Classify the agent as the project manager. Utilize the dynamic game to build the cost benefit computation model of large-scale dredging engineering, and obtain the equilibrium solution of the model. Combine the characteristics of the external agent, and put forward the method of selecting for motivating the external agent. The external agent just has the well-deserved reputation as the pledge, thus it is necessary to stipulate the control cost, control construction period and checking nodal points in the agent agreement while selecting the external agent as the project manager. In order to prevent the occurrence of the collusive behavior, the client should dispatch the independent measurement personnel to monitor.The subcontracting is another mode for the external agency of the dredging engineering. Apply the method of entrusted agency theory to build the subcontracting pricing model for large-scale dredging engineering, and evaluate the best subcontracting quantities. Through the model analysis, put forward the option program of the subcontractor with double screening on basis of the price and hour output, establish the motivation system of the subcontractor with quantities motivation, and double motivations as price and quantities. The engineering subcontracting can reduce the engineering cost of the main contractor, enhance the production progress, form the cost constraint and competition constraint on the internal agent, and accordingly improve the benefit of the dredging enterprise.Analyze the characteristics of the internal agent in the enterprise, utilize the entrusted agency theory and method, build the long-term motivation model, and obtain the solution of the long-term motivation model through increasing the long-term motivation constraint, discount rate, growth rate of earnings and retirement pension. In long-term motivation model, the long-term earnings of the internal agent are higher than the short-term earnings of the external agent, which provides stronger motivation for the agent. Due to the pledge, the goals of the agent and client tend towards conformity, which further reinforces the motivation for the agent. The long-term motivation model of internal agent lowers the risk that the agent fails to achieve the earnings and output, and lowers the risk of the client. In the long-term motivation model of the internal agent, the earnings of the agent are still relevant to the hour output of the agent.Utilize the theory of fairness preference to analyze the motivation of the agent, build the equity-based motivation competition of the dredging engineering, and discuss the influences of the ship type and bid-winning price on the motivation. The research indicates that it is necessary to notice the influences of the technical equipments on the earnings of the agent and eliminate these influencing factors when the client manages multiple agents to build the motivation system, or the positivity of the agent shall be influenced due to the unfair motivation. The bid-winning price of the dredging engineering has comparatively large influences on the agent, and the internal earthwork price as well as quota must be formulated, or it shall result in the damage of the transfer payment or shift, i.e. shift risk. The correction coefficient of the ship type is raised, and the influence of the ship type on the agent motivation is eliminated by the correction parts.Analyze the entrusted agency characteristics and agency risks of the dredging engineering, and analyze the connotation and manifestation of the entrusted agency risks during the dredging engineering, and put forward the corresponding risk prevention and control measures, which have some guiding significances for the management of the dredging engineering.