Research On The Pricing And Trading Strategy In Merger And Acquisition

With the aid of the theories and methods such as uncertain theory, real option andgame theory, this dissertation gives a deep study of the pricing and trading strategy inmerger and acquisition (M&A), in the hope of offering some valuable references forthe practice in M&A of our country.The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows.First, to the defects of the traditional DCF model, this dissertation, regarding thefree cash flows of enterprise as random variables, sets up DCF models under randomsituation under the circumstances that the discount rate is constant and randomvariable respectively. Based on these improved DCF models, some examples aregiven about calculating the valve of target enterprise using random simulationmethod.Second, because of the shortage of the information of relevant historical data inreality, in addition the complexity and uncertainty of the objective environment, it isdifficult to predict the free cash flows of enterprise accurately, and its rough intervalrange can only be got. In view of this kind of situation, this dissertation sets up a DCFmodel under fuzzy situation, describing the free cash flows of enterprise as fuzzyvariables, and provides an example to calculate the value of target enterprise using thefuzzy simulation method.Third, this dissertation deals with parameters of the probability distribution whichthe free cash flows of enterprise obey into fuzzy variables, thus the free cash flows ofenterprise are random fuzzy variables. Considering two cases that the discount rate isconstant and random variable respectively, this dissertation sets up improved DCFmodels under random fuzzy situation so as to get more accurate and reasonablevaluation of target enterprise, and provides examples to calculate the value of targetenterprise utilizing the random fuzzy simulation method.Fourth, the players can freely use the negotiation and bidding mechanism to fightfor corporate control of the target, and they can determine themselves the type ofopening and closing stage (bidding or negotiation), as well as the number of gamestages and the number of times that the players move back and forth between biddingand negotiation in a takeover game. Under above assumptions, this dissertationmodels non-discriminatory game and discriminatory game respectively, and carries onresearch to the trading strategy of the game contestants.Fifth, to the defects of traditional methods of corporate valuation, this dissertationsets up an improved method of target corporate valuation based on the real optiontheory. This dissertation also analysis real option traits arising from M&A investment,and studies the pricing of option to defer investment embedded in M&A.