Research On The Stability Problems Of China Electricity Power Industry Economy

There are some actual and latent problems about the stability of China electricityindustry economy: the systematic structure of the China electricity industry economy,the spreading of periodic volatility from the gross economic fluctuation to electricityindustry economy, the herding in China electricity investment market and the riskfaced by the regulation of the electricity retail market. In theory, the systematicstructure of the stability of electricity industry economy has three subsystem which liehigher in turn: the stability of the physical electricity system, the electricity marketsystem and the economic relationship system. The highest subsystem includesfundamental, general and initiative elements. According to the social and economicenvironments in China, the twenty-six important elements are built into the systematicstructure of the stability of China electricity industry economy. In the core of thesystem, the subsystem consists of the prices, the available demands and supply ofelectricity.The spreading of periodic volatility from the gross economic fluctuation toelectricity industry economy is one of the important subjects in the stability theory onelectricity industry economy. A set of methods that analyze the spreading of periodicvolatility are designed out using the analysis tools of time and frequency domain.After choosing the statistic index measuring the electricity industry and grosseconomy, the demonstration analysis is carried out using the data of China electricityindustry and gross economy. The main period in which the gross economic fluctuationis spreads to electricity industry economy is 6-7 years, the path of spreading is grosseconomic→electricity investment →electricity industry, and the length of lag is oneyear.The electricity investment upsurge has been spreading in China since 2002. Thecharacters of herding that the electricity investment decisions are consistency manifestgradually. The herding in electricity investment market is the results of all theinvestors' rational games. The mixed strategy game model is proposed, in which theNash equilibriums are solved for two players. The model shows there are twomechanism of the herding: the same information source for the investors and theinfluence on each other among the investors. The herding in the electricity investmentmarket in China is prompted by the stimulation from the power shortage in china, thedrive of economic expanding from the investors and the prospect of the drasticcompetitions in the power market in the future.Non-life actuarial theory is applied to separating the market risk from the priceregulation in electricity retail market. The concepts of fair value and robust price aredefined. In the model of regulation proposed, the huge market risk can be separatedfrom the price regulation and the asymmetry of cost information can be weakenedbetween the regulators and the regulated. The simulation example for robust pricedemonstrates that the demanded security level against market risk can beaccomplished by assigning the right value for the security loading coefficient. Underthe given regulation system, the system of the risk of price gap between the retail andwholesale price is proposed in which the risk capital for the price gap risk is computedand contributed to the different risk management method. In the final, the efficientfrontier is applied to setting up the model of optimal quantities of power purchased inthe future and spot market.