Family Business Agent Research, And Performance Issues

Currently, the foreign academics'research on the topic of agency problem is on the basis of enterprise with separate shares holdings. Berle & Means (1932) are the first to carry out an analysis on this topic, followed by Jensen & Meckling (1976), and Grossman & Hart (1980) who further developed this theory. In their research, they generally categorize family enterprise to being classical enterprise; believing that family enterprise through holding both ownership rights and management rights, does not have agency problem. However, a recently research discovered that family altruism can also seriously influence the family business system as well as causing the agency problem. Moreover, family enterprise does not only have one type of configuration. In the enterprise's different development stages, its ownership rights and management rights presents different combination with the agency problem having different characteristics. This article discussed the agency problem from the static and dynamic angles as well as from the theoretic and practical points of view; proposed the different characteristics of the agency problem between family enterprise and non-family enterprise as well as its influences on the enterprise performances. This article also systematically conducts a comprehensive research on the family enterprise's agency problem base on different time era. This is an attempt to the developing of the family enterprise theory with boththeoretic and practical significances.There are 6 chapters in this article. They are as follows: Chapter one mainly sets the foundation for the fundamental research into the family enterprises agency theory with narration on the general agency theory. The agency theory mainly explains the dilemmas of the conflict of interests that causes the agency problem. Agency theory's foundation is the dilemmas of dealing with incomplete information. Due to the incomplete of information, the agent makes use of the situation when the principle does not understand the information; to carry out adverse selection and moral hazard pursues so as to achieve activities of self-interests that are differ from that of the principle's own interests, namely so-called opportunism behavior. This section, from the angle of incomplete information, elaborates possible formation on the conflict of interests from the acquiring of different information from different sides or...