| As the core of modern economic activities, commercial banks are greatly influenced by the instability of external capital---the deposit-related debt and their operation is highly risky. As a matter of fact, in the backdrop of market economy, according to the view point of game theory, information economics theory and institutional economics theory, from the micro perspective, the two parties in involved in deposit relations (commercial bank and the depositor) are in an interests game. Their game practices are directly influenced by their respective earning functions. The operation of the game follows the demands of market mechanism. System as an important factor can affect the utility function of choice of the parties involved in the deposit relations. Bringing into play the restricting function of encouragement, we can offer ruling on deposit stability. To achieve this, a scheme that governs deposit stability can be established by using complete and proper system and mechanism.1. The stability of commercial banker's deposit depends on the pattern of game choice of parties in the deposit relations. No matter what the outer economic environment is, the deposit relation is embodied through the trade–off and choice action of the depositors and commercial bank and expressed by the results of the game. In the case of unbalanced information sharing, the game and choice that depositors and commercial banks make from the aspect of minimizing their own interests are not single-game and double-game. Instead, it is the result of long-term game. Although the former carefully illustrate the deposit relation from more than one details, it can not sufficiently describe the whole picture of deposit event. The difference between long-term game and short-term game is that the long-term game aims at creating a win-win situation expecting to have the biggest effectiveness. In the circumstance of the unpredictability of future, expectation provides cooperation... |
