The Game Theoretical Study On China's Securities Market Regulation

In this paper , I analyzes the game behaviors between supervisor and manager . Taking apart the relation between supervisor and manager clearly and finding ways to improve the efficiency of securities regulation.I found that it is not effective to improve the regulation efficiency if we hardly punish supervisor who is not studious and dutiful, which can cause collusive behavior between supervisor and manager in some conditions. Using game theory, this paper researched renting and collusive issues in securities markets ,and I draw a few useful conclusions : if variable subjects to uniform, any bribor can not increase his bribe and work even if other bribors become more and more; in some situation, I gave an accurate formula, with which we can figure out the number of exterior auditors that listed company needs. In the last , I used true people to do five experiments on renting and collusive issue in laboratory, and experimental conclusions are exciting and useful,which match experimental mechanism design very well.The using new approaches in composing dissertation involve game theory , principal-agent theory and experimental economics . The studying innovation is : 1) Analytic approaches are new and frontier . Using game theory , I constructed some game analytic models of securities regulation behaviors , which can clearly and wholly post game behaviors , renting or collusive issues between supervisory and manager . At laboratory , using experimental economics approach , we did five controlled experiments on subjects , and observed their renting and collusive behaviors ,which are very hard to be observed in real life . With controlling parameters ,I can find which factors are important to renting and collusive issues .2) The studying conclusions are useful . According to these conclusions , we may both directly guild mechanism design of proofing securities regulation , and may directly have reference effect for other industries .3) In laboratory experiments with true men , we can find clearly that renting or supervisory collusion behaviors related with established each other trust and reciprocity during mostly repeated game . Many reasons caused collusion come into being : regulation institute is unreasonable , intensity of regulation is not enough , discipline is executed rarely , and so on .By the situation of securities market and regulation institute , legislature should perfect legislation of securities regulation firstly . Relaying on related laws ,administrators can work routinely and punish irregularity , and put an end to kinds of contraband . Administrative departments should consummate executive codes , cut down expenditure of regulation , hold back kinds of illegal behaviors timely and effectively ; securities guild should make more function ; economists should supervise securities market with news and media groups , which makes fee mostly sleazy .