| Corporate conflict, which lies in interpersonal contradiction in the hierarchy or conclusin and confrontation between hierarchy and inter-firm friction, is very popular. And it does great harm to corporate. Most work focused on post conflict management. And instead the dissertation tries to explore the coordination mechanism for ex corporate conflit management with game theory and incentive economics.Corporate conflit, which splits into 3 categories: conflict in the hierarchy, conflict between hierarchy and conflict between corporate and it's outer stakeholders. For the conflict in the hierarchy the dissertation introduced strategic behavior and explored how authority allocation affects relationship coordination in the hierarchy. It is found that mean-authority-allocation, which helps information release, is superior to dominant-authority-allocation and can prevent conflict in the hierarchy as a institutional coordination way.For the conflict between hierarchies the dissertation made Pareto effevtive endeavor come true under the given coordination with authority allocation discrimination. Further the implicit authority allocation discrimination, which leads to information asymmetry and interest conflit between agents, is better than the explicit one for conflict coordination.For the conflict between corporate and it's outer stakeholders it is found that the government-oriented coordination helps improve competition environment and creat competitive advantage. And different political economic system comes to different coordination strategy. |