Study On System Of Corporate Governance For Listed Companies In China

This paper intends to analyze empirically the decisional elements and optimum assessment standards for corporate governance of the listed companies in China today. After investigating completely into the practice of corporate governance and related research literatures in China and abroad, some theoretical propositions and principles are put forward in the paper based on the enterprise contract theory, principle-agent theory, property ownership theory etc.. By comparison of different corporate governance theory system and mode in the world, the paper makes an empirical test to disclosure the formulation and feature of corporate governance of the listed companies, the reason of problems existed in China is found, in which, institutional design and policy suggestion are proposed.1 Main ContentsThis paper is about the study on how to strengthen and optimalize the corporate governance system for listed companies in China. The main contents include: 1. Comparatively analyzing the corporate governance system for overseas listed companies; 2. Designing the theoretical analysis frame for corporate governance system of listed companies in China; 3. Empirically analyzing the governance system and running achievement of listed companies in China; 4. Studying the transition and existed problems of the companies; 5. Analyzing the reasons for the unhealthiness of the companies; 6. Studying the influence of the unhealthiness; 7. Designing the corporate governance system for listed companies in China; 8. Putting forth some policy suggestions to make the corporate governance system healthy2 Main Conclusion1. The Corporate governance System for listed companies in China is of generality and particularity of the classic company governance system. Traditional theory indicated that the core problem is principle-agent relationship so as to efficiently supervise managers to improve the value of enterprise according to benefit maximum. managers to improve the value of enterprise according to benefit maximum. The precondition of the theory is that shareholder is equity in benefit allocation, but not in reality, usually shareholders face interest conflict instead. Highly-concentrated state-owned ownership exists among most of listed companies in China, this structure will result in differ in manager and their behavior because of the different target of corporate governance and benefit gambling.2. Besides the "insider controlling ownership' problem existed in the corporate governance system, there is controlling shareholder ownership which needs careful treatment. In the paper the structure of controlling shareholder become the sore problem which make cash flow to larger shareholder and damage the interest of minority shareholder. Insider controlling may damage the benefit of whole shareholders and even stakeholder.3. The quality and structure of stock right, the incentive mechanism and the rule-obeying operation have remarkable impact on company's achievement. The structure of controlling ownership by state does not benefit to improve corporate governance.4. There are very serious problems existed in the corporate governance system.5. There are various factors that cause the unhealthiness of the system.6. The unhealthiness of the system has brought remarkable influence and consequence.7. The transition of the corporate governance system is the transition of the government-leading system which is forcible and advances, increases gradually.3 Important Viewpoints1. All corporate governance systems are built on the historic tradition, economic level and legal policy of certain society. It is in vain to create best and sole standard to assess corporate governance in the world.2. Reinforcing the efficiency and the independence of board is the key factor to improve the internal governance of listed companies.3. The perfection of the corporate governance system needs a systematical design, considering structure, inner mechanism and surroundings.4. Protecting shareholder's interest, especially minor shareholder's interest is viewed as the major objective of corporate governance.5. The unhealthiness of the system was caused not only by the system, but also by the incorrect instructive theory and unsuitable operation mechanism..4 Originalities1. Basing on the theory of rough sets, the author established a model to assess listed companies' achievement2. From the point of theory and operation, the author constructed an assessing system for the rationalization of the corporate governance system of listed companies in China.3. Putting forth the evaluating system for opposing shareholder and the sublevel voting system which agree with China's real condition..