Study On Mechanism Of Rural Public Finance

Rural public finance plays an important role in providing rural public goods, ensuring the normal operation of rural governments, maintaining rural tranquilization and so on. But rural public finance is facing a lot of problems, such as public financial deficits, disjointing of rural public goods' demand and supply, over-abundance of civil servants and so on. These problems affect the functions of rural public finance. Many experts have studied them, and got many beneficial results. But there are some defects, such as shortage of new theory angles, and scarcity of theory model in the study of rural public goods and rural public financial revenue and expenditure.Therefore, the author studied on mechanism of rural public finance from the respect of the central government' s control and local governments' self-benefit behavior; the rural public goods value model was founded to derive the optimal output of rural public goods; linear regression methods and the model of the central government' s control and local governments' self-benefit behavior was adopted to study rural public financial revenue and expenditure.The following part is the skeleton of the paper.The first chapter is introduction which includes the background, significance, objects, methods, other scholars' studies summarization, structure, and possible innovation points.In the second chapter, we establish the frame of the central government' s control and local governments' self-benefit motivation, and finally it is put up with the game relationship of superior governments and the rural governments.In the third chapter, the author will discuss the functions of rural public finance, and analyze the demand and supply of rural public goods. After studying the relation between the county' government and the rural governments, the author finds the institutional reasons of disjointing of rural public goods' demand and supply.In the fourth chapter, with the data of dozens of villages or towns from different regions, the author generalizes the characteristics of the rural financial income including budgetary income, and off-budgetary income. We conclude the peculiarity of budgetary income is the mechanism of maximizing the public financial income. And we study the relation between the country' s government and the rural governments in the respect of public financial income by separating income model. Then we have analyzed the reasons of mechanism by using the rural public income model of the central government' s control and local governments' self-benefit behavior.Still with the data of dozens of villages or towns from different regions, we start to study another topic in the fifth chapter. It is rural public financial expenditure. The author finds its characteristic is the mechanism of salaries payment, and the author has analyzed the reasons of it by means of expenditure model of the central government' s control and local governments' self-benefit behavior.In the sixth chapter, we will study the self-support problem of rural public finance, and under the frame of the central government' s control and self-benefit motivation of local governments, we expatiate the birth and development of rural public financial debts. Then we find there are six methods in which rural governments can lessen deficit, such as increasing agricultural tax, asking for funds from superior governments, embezzling funds, selling public resources, reducing payments and enlarging debts. Then the author points out the balloon mechanism and the methods to overcome the problems of the high-pressure public finance system.In the seventh chapter, the author puts up with the measures to perfect the system of rural public finance. The measures contain lessening the central government' s control, restricting the motivation of rural governments, correcting the salary payment functions, perfecting transfer payment system, and so on.The innovations in this essay may be as follows: Firstly, the frame of the central government' s control and the local governments' self-benefit behavior has been founded. Secondly, the mechanism of budgetary income is the object which is lack of study. The author has studied it and concluded the peculiarity of budgetary income is the mechanism of maximizing the public financial income. Thirdly, off-budgetary expenditure is also the object lack of study; the author have studied it too and found the reason of "salary public finance" . Fourthly, off-budgetary expenditure was studied from its change current and the relation between the public goods supply and it. Fifthly, based on the theory of consumers' value and the experience of apportioning fairly the public goods' changes among peasants, the author made up the rural public goods value model, and concluded the optimization output. Sixthly, the author founded the rural public income model of the central government' s control and local governments' self-benefit behavior in the foundation of the 1-1-1 model.