Research On Optimization Of Fiscal And Tax Relations Between The Central And Local Governments Under The Background Of Limited Government

The fiscal and taxation system is an important part of the national governance system.The scientific fiscal and taxation system is the institutional guarantee for optimizing the allocation of resources,maintaining market unity,promoting social equity,and safeguarding the country's long-term stability.The key to establish the core of the modern fiscal and taxation system is to handle the fiscal and taxation relationship of the central region.The essence of the relationship between central and local finance and taxation is the handing of the relationship between centralization and decentralization of fiscal management authority.The treatment of centralization and decentralization is related to the economic system.The operation of China's economic system has mainly gone through three stages: the planned economy period,the planned transition period to the market and the market economy period.Under different economic systems,the government plays a different role in the process of resource allocation.Under the planned economic system,the government plays a decisive role in the process of resource allocation and belongs to the “all-round” government.In the process of transition to the market economy system,the government is in many fields.With the gradual withdrawal,the market began to play a fundamenta l role in the process of resource allocation.The government changed from a“all-round” government to a “catch-up” government;the economic system reform continued to deepen,the market economic system continued to improve,the government further withdrew,and the market was in resources.The decisive role played a role in the configuration process,and the government changed from a “catch-up” government to a “limited” government.The central government's fiscal and taxation relations also take different forms under different economic systems.Throughout the path of fiscal and taxation reform in the central regi on of China,we have experienced three stages.One is the “collective system”under the planned economic system,the second is the “division of eating”model in the transitional economy,and the third is the market economy.The tax sharing system under the system.Among them,the tax-sharing reform in1994 basically established the framework and prototype of China's modern fiscal and taxation system.On the basis of sub-category of central and local government financial power and authority,local governments gradually become administrative subjects with relatively independent financial rights.Exploring the starting point and origin of the tax-sharing reform in 1994,the original intention of the design is biased,that is,more considerations should be made to deal with the two urgent problems at that time: "the proportion of fiscal revenue in GDP and the proportion of central government revenue in national revenue will gradually decrease." The effectiveness of the tax-sharing reform was immediate,quickly reversing the weak position of the central government in the fiscal discourse,and greatly safeguarding the political authority of the central government.However,after all,the tax-sharing reform is a preliminary exploration of China's establishment of a modern fiscal and taxation system.There are also many imperfections.The most criticized place is the ali enation of the central government's fiscal and taxation relations caused by the tax-sharing reform.The asymmetry of financial power and power.The dissimilat ion of fiscal and taxation relations in the central region has many aspects of economic appearance,such as government failure,malformed land finance,low fiscal transparency,market segmentation,and regional financial regional differe ntiation,which have severely curbed the further improvement of China's economic efficiency.In addition,as China's economic reforms enter the deep water period,China's economic growth model should shift more from “promising government” to “effective market”,while the necessary condition for effective market is “limited government”.Relationships are a must for building a “limited government”.The purpose of this study is to explore how to optimize the fiscal and taxation relationship of the central region in the context of limited government.Based on the historical review of the relationship between government functio ns and the central government's fiscal and taxation relationship,this study first analyzes the economic appearance and causes of the alienation of fiscal and taxation relations in the central government under the background of limited government,and based on the game theory analysis method for the limited government background.The game of local finance and taxation was analyzed and discussed.Secondly,the efficiency of the adjustment of fiscal and taxation relations in the central region was tested.The efficiency of the central government's appropriate decentralization of financial power and the right to receivethe transaction was tested,which proved the necessity of adjusting the fiscal and taxation relationship of the central region.Under the background of the transformation of government functions,the relationship between fiscal decentral ization and local financial resources construction is analyzed.It is pointed out that fiscal decentralization plays a role in promoting local financial resources under the background of the transformation of government functions.Finally,it explores the path to optimize the relationship between central and local finance and taxation under background of limited government.The final conclusions are as follows:1.China's current fiscal and taxation relationship in the central region is alienated.The economic appearance of the alienation of fiscal and taxation relations in the central region includes: government failure,unsustainable local finance,“land finance”,local government debt problems,regional fiscal regional differentiation,and low fiscal transparency.The fundamental reason for the alie nation of the central government's finances is still the division of central and local powers,the division of financial power and the dissatisfaction of expendit ures.Due to the upward shift of financial power,the shift of powers,and the unclear government functions,it is difficult for local financial difficulty to meet the needs of local fiscal expenditures.This has led to a series of local government actions such as“running money”,“land finance” and local debt problems.2.The alienation of fiscal and taxation relations in the central region is the result of the central and local game.Based on game theory analysis,it is found that the order of action of the central and local governments is different,and the equilibrium results are different.Local governments always choose the best action strategy for themselves,but if they do not,the local government will By slackening the way,the central government is forced to make corresponding concessions.After the tax-sharing reform,local governments were given greater responsibility for economic entities,but they showed serious asymmetry in financial power and power.This led to a series of alienated financial relations such as the issuance of urban investments bonds and tax competition by local governments based on self-interest motive.3.The central government's right to collect and decentralize financial power plays an important role in improving China's economic efficiency.This study uses the dynamic panel model-based system GMM to quantitatively analyzethe impact of the central government's right to receive and decentralize financial power on economic efficiency.The results of the study show that for every1% increase in the central government's right to receive rights,the economic efficiency will increase by 0.556%,while the degree of central decentralization of financial power will increase by 1%,and the economic efficiency will increase by 0.336%.This side verifies that the central government's right to receive and decentralize financial power plays an important role in improving China's economic efficiency.Therefore,the next step in fiscal and tax reform is that the central government should appropriately decentralize the right to decentralize certain financial powers based on the principle of “completion of financial reso urces,financial power and power” and re-match the financial power and power of the local government.4.“Chinese-style” fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on local financial resources construction.Through qualitative and quantitative analysis,it is fully proved that with the transformation of government functions,the "Chinese-style" fiscal decentralization has played a positive role in promoting local financial resources construction.This "stress-type" fiscal system not only promotes the construction of local government financial resources,but also promotes local economic development,optimizes industrial structure,and promotes urbanization.Local economic growth,industrial structure optimization and urbanization cons truction are also conducive to the construction of local financial resources,which provide a solid foundation and conditions for the final optimization of the fiscal and taxation relationship of the central region.The analysis also found that with the continuous improvement of the level of economic development,further optimization of local fiscal expenditure structure can provide more space for the optimization of fiscal and tax relations in the future.This finding clarifies the issues that need to be focused on for the optimization of the fiscal an d taxation relationship of the central region,that is,paying more attention to optimizing the local fiscal expenditure structure.