A Research On The Invitation And Fusion Of Professional Manager In Enterprise

Western managerial revolution has not only undergone the transformation of what the firm owner controls and how he controls, but also promoted the forming of professional managers, thus bringing about the modern firm system. The evolution of western firm system has proved the significance of professional managers invited and its fusion with enterprises to establish modern firm system. However, in present China the lack of internal effective government and incentive mechanism; and the insufficiency of external institutions resulting in the market to play the effective restrict role difficultly; and the lack of credit system and the imperfect legal institutions also causing the moral hazard and the adverse section in flood. Therefore, the pattern and the way of professional managers invited and its fusion with enterprises in China are inevitably different from the western nation. The thesis discusses the influence factors and reasons, and suggests and proves new pattern and new way. The thesis aims at following: Probes the agent, the barrier and the basic logic of enterprises to invite professional managers; Discloses the strategy choice mechanism of enterprises to invite professional managers; Discloses the influence mechanism of the fusion between professional managers and enterprises and analyzes its influence factors; Establishes coordination and restriction mechanism which based on the fusion between professional managers and enterprises.Based on game theory, informational economics, contract economics, property right economics, new institutional economics and real options theory, the thesis brings to bear induces and deducts unifies, theory elaboration and case analysis and empirical analysis unifies, economic model analysis and real options analysis method to probe professional manager invited and its fusion with enterprises. By doing so, it advances such achievements as following:(1) The logic relationship analysis model of professional managers invited in the firm growth process is established and analyzed. The research indicated that, the firm growth needs the professional managers' specificity knowledge capital urgently, therefore, it is the only way to invite professional managers to implement professional management in the firm developing; On the other hand, asymmetric information will cause the moral hazard and the adverse section in flood, and becomes the main barrier to invite professional managers. Revolves around this idea, the potential manager's management ability and reputation capital are implanted the basic analysis frame for enterprises to invite professional managers. It proves that the professional manager individual accumulation reputation capital can relieve asymmetrical information effectively, the enterprise may change the judgment for potential manager's management ability and ex post opportunism cost by expecting individual reputation capital, and causes to realize the enterprise to invite professional managers.(2) The firms' optimal invite time to professional managers and the principal-agent relationship analyze and its model deduct. The research indicated, although enterprises may reduce the management cost which the transaction complication or the scale expands brings ,and obtains relative high repayment by inviting professional managers, but it involves agent cost inevitably due to professional managers invited, in some situations, the benefit increase is possibly insufficient to compensate the agent cost. Therefore, it is not the optimal choice at any time for enterprises to invite professional managers. Along this idea, the thesis established and deduct the firms' optimal invite time to professional managers model and its principal-agent relationship with real options and classic principal-agent theory, and obtains following analysis conclusions: Enterprises will invite professional managers only if enterprise's market demand scale expands to the certain degree, the business management becomes quite complex. Due to the market demand scale gradually expansion, enterprise's expectation income may compensate the invited cost which gradually enhances, and therefore, the enterprises will invite professional managers along the path from the supervisor to intermediate to top.At the same time, it proves when the value of real options considered: the enterprise's optimal decision to manager's participation proportion will be smaller, and this kind of disparity will reduce along with the market demand volatility increases; The market demand risk is bigger the enterprise facing, the manager is willing to undertake bigger risk of participation proportion; The manager's optimal decision to effort will be bigger than the real options is not considered, and this kind of disparity will increase ,and the manager's optimal decision to effort will decrease according the market demand volatility increases.(3) To analysis the strategy way choice to the professional manager invited, the thesis overcame the shortages that compared the managers' management ability or the knowledge specificity difference between hires and promotes merely, adopting real options and equilibrium analysis method of classic economics suggests a more feasible way that synthesis measured the potential manager's management ability, the transaction cost and the specificity knowledge. That is to say, it is the enterprise's optimal choice to hire manager from exterior only if the specificity of manager hired from exterior is satisfied with enterprise's requirement, and brings the income sufficiently to compensate the transaction cost lap.(4) The thesis suggests new idea to realize the fusion between professional managers and enterprises by using analysis method of principal-agent theory and game theory. The thesis proposes that, to establish the coordination and restricting mechanism based on the fusion between professional managers and enterprises should be advantageous to relieve the asymmetrical information and double moral hazard, and to strengthen the mutual trust relations. Meanwhile, this mechanism resulted from mutual gambling. Comparing with the previous research, the thesis gains achievements: To roundly analyze the factors of influencing the fusion between professional managers and enterprises, and to disclose the interior mechanism of this fusion; To overcome the shortage of broad concept frame analysis paradigm, and to suggest new mentality to realize the fusion between professional managers and enterprises from quantitative and qualitative two aspects.