The Incentive Problems Research Of Our Country’s Professional Managers From Family Enterprises

With the deepening of reformation and opening-up policy in China, the development of the private enterprises obtained the rapid development. The private enterprises make great influence to our country. Family enterprise which is seen as the leader in private economic is the most important part of private enterprises in China. However, with the expanding scale of family enterprises in our country, the traditional management way is not suitable for the sustainable development family businesses. If family enterprises intend to continue to gain sustainable competitive advantage, they have to change the existing management way and introduce the modern management methods. History tells us, the change of family enterprise to a modern enterprise will not hold for man’s will. Family enterprises which employ professional managers are complied with the law of development. But, the reality is not able to give satisfactory results. Family enterprises in China appeared in the process of hiring professional managers are difficult to reconcile the conflicts. For professional managers, they can’t obtain the trust of the owners. For family enterprises, they are not willing to put too much power to professional managers. They hire professional managers in the problem of agency for business owners also difficult to trust each other. Such a vicious cycle of necessarily hinder the sustainable development of family enterprises.This thesis mainly adapts qualitative and normative analysis method, literature analysis method and theory analysis method of combining multiple. By using the principal-agent theory and the analyzing of the introduction of professional managers of family firms in China, combined with the success of the foreign management mode and the actual situation of family firms in China will give constructive incentive countermeasures and measures.The full text is divided into seven parts. The first part is introduction. It puts forward the research background and significance of this paper. The second part is theoretical review. It includes family enterprises, the professional managers and the principal-agent theory, theoretical review and comment. The third part is our country family enterprise and professional managers. It summarizes the present situation of the professional managers and our family enterprises. The fourth part is to analyze the present principal-agent problems in our family enterprises. The fifth part is mainly to introduce the methods using by Japan in the management of family businesses and advanced management mode of professional managers in the United States. The sixth part is in view of the above analysis.This paper has the three innovation parts. First, selecting the topic has the certain innovation. The private enterprise in our country is an important part of the family business. So the research object of this thesis has representativeness. The second is added to the family business to introduce professional managers in the research of principal-agent problems. At present our country enterprise research object more focused on principal-agent problems that exist in the state-owned enterprises. Compared with the state-owned enterprise, the family enterprises are quite different. Third, family enterprise incentive research is not enough, especially in the relatively few involved in research of the construction of the professional managers incentive system. Therefore, further study of the family business introduction of professional managers. The incentive problem will be beneficial to deepen and enrich the enterprise management theory and incentive theory.Based on the analysis summary from the actual situation of family enterprises in China, paper uses principal-agent theory and incentive theory analyze the problem and intend to find the suitable way for family enterprises in China in order to improve the research content about family business principal-agent problems.Considered my limited knowledge and ability, there are also many papers need to perfect and have the unsolved problem. The principal-agent problems in family firms not only involve the principal-agent problems of owner and operator. For large family enterprise, principal-agent problems will expand to large shareholders and small shareholders. In addition, for the analysis of the principal-agent framework, there is too lay particular stress on theory, the paper lacks of certain data and case analysis. The existence of these problems will motivate the author in the later work and study further attention and research.