A Study Of The Efficiency Strcuture And Instutition Of Chinese Commercial Banks

The starting point of economists' analyzing issues is efficiency,which is one of the three important elements in the analysis framework of modem economics.The paper points out the analysis framework of governance,conduct and performance on the Micro-efficiency Structure of commercial banks,and makes a theory and empirical study on the efficiency structure and its factors of Chinese commercial banks on the basis of summarizing the theory and estimating method of efficiency.In the clue of the constraints of efficiency and the development of Economics,Chapter 2 firstly summarizes the efficiency theory,and then compares the parameter method and the non- parameter method which are dominated by Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Approach respectively,analyzing the advantages,disadvantages and applicability of these methods,and finally points out the problems needing attention in estimating efficiency of Chinese commercial banks.Taking the ratio of pre-tax profit and assets as the dependent variable,chapter 1 estimates the efficiency structure of Chinese commercial banks using SFA.The X-profit efficiency for the state-owned banks and that for the joint-stock ones have structural differences,on an ascending basis.Although both of them have the increasing scale efficiency,in view of evolution,their scale efficiency and scope efficiency are weakened gradually.Scope efficiency seems not to exist in the state-owned banks,but in the joint-stock ones,it does exist to a certain extent.Chinese commercial banks are typical periodical industry according to the empirical analysis of chapter 5,because their efficiency is closely related to macro economy.The key factor causing those differences seems to be the property rights institution,but market competition also plays an important role on the efficiency of commercial banks,both of which affect this efficiency complementarily instead of substitutionarily.Chapter 5 makes a positivist research on the efficiency structure of Chinese commercial banks through two-stage DEA.Their economic efficiency rises with fluctuation.Little difference exiting among the majority of the banks,the allocation efficiency and scale efficiency exert important influence on the economic efficiency.Joint-stock banks hold a higher efficiency than the state-owned ones on the average.Chapter 6 studies the difference of human capital productivity,and loan competition behavior between the state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock ones from the Perspective of theoretical and empirical analysis.The human capital productivity of Joint-stock commercial banks is higher than the state-owned ones.Using their higher efficiency of human capital and the favorable macroscopic economic environment,The formers allocate more loans to the region and enterprises with strong profit ability,realizing a high-efficiency and scale expansion.Chapter 7 makes a comparative study about the general law of the evolvement of the spatial structure,and its effects on efficiency between the Industrial & Commercial Bank and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank.Adopting the "Gradational Progression" model, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank not only enlarges its scale but also improves its efficiency.Industrial & Commercial Bank took the "parallel Progression" model with the result of enlarging its scale but reducing efficiency due to the extension of its scale beyond its administration radius in prophase.However,in anaphase,Industrial & Commercial Bank recombines and relocates the braches with the result of simplifying its administrative structure and improving its efficiency.Chapter 8 theoretically explains why the efficiency and the management behavior of the state-owned banks and that for the joint-stock ones have structural differences.The essential differences between the behaviors of state-owned banks and joint-stock ones are caused by the differences in their property right institution,especially in the incentive mechanism.The poor performance of state-owned caused by its property fight institution is magnified by the burden of policy.Introducing the state-owned banks and the joint-stock ones to the model simultaneously, chapter 1 makes a theoretical analysis and empirical test on the institutional evolvement of Chinese banks system.There is a dynamic interaction relationship between banks system reform and its efficiency change.Chapter 10 summarizes the conclusions and points out some suggestions.