Research On Two-sided Network Externality And Ownership In B2B Electronic Intermediaries Adoption

B2B electronic intermediaries are new type organizations who act as not only fitting buying and selling enterprises, providing information services, but also promoting their transactions. They are also aiming to earn largest profits. On the B2B electronic intermediaries, the enterprises on both sides are components of a two-sided market. Network externality on the platform is the important factors that help the intermediary successfully attracted both sides entered members. This dissertation has reviewed the papers researching about B2B electronic intermediaries and two-sided markets problems of industry economics. The author believes that B2B electronic intermediaries are representative two-sided markets and two-sided network externality is the effectual tool for analyzing B2B electronic intermediaries.This dissertation's main points: 1) The author prove B2B electronic intermediaries are two-sided markets through economic models. By starting from the discussion of the "dis-intermediary or re-intermediary hypothesis", the author has established a compeing model of a electronic intermediary with a traditional intermediary. The author has researched the reason for electrnoc intermediary to come out and progress.2) This dissertation has brought a category of B2B electronic intermediaries according to their ownerships' forms. That is neutral public B2B electronic intermediary, bias public B2B electronic intermediary and appropriative B2B electronic intermediary. Such category is accomplished with the Electronic Market Hypothesis which is based on the Transaction Cost Economic theory. With the ownership category of B2B electronic intermediaries, the author has compared the public and private B2B electronic intermediaries with a strict games model. On the buyers' side, the best decision of procurement is to enter public B2B electronic intermediary, which is superior to prietary one. By studying the competition model of neutral B2B electronic intermediary with bias one, the author has introduced the network externality into the analysis. Our complete information dynamic games model has given a result of subgame perfect equilibrium, which is neutral B2B electronic intermediary is overhelming.3) This dissertation has made an experotary study of the evidence for B2B electronic intermediary to exist. Through a Structural Equation Model method and large sample data with a systematically survey, the author has confirmed the three hypothesies which is Corresponding to the given conditions in previous theory research parts. Firstly, both the transaction cost and network externality factors are obviously related factors for enterprises choosing to join the platform. Secondly, network externality is differently related to price structure for both sides on the platform. That is to say network externality is different reason for the membership's decision. Finally, network externality is notably different between the neutral and bias public B2B electronic intermediary, which prove that the ownership category is reasonable.