| The research on CEO turnover abroad started in the 60th of 20th century. Under the analytical framework of the incomplete contracts, and based on the traditional principle-agency theory and early corporate governance theory, the corporate governance scholars, financial scholars, carried out a large amount of effective research. However, the"Law and Economics"which emerged in the 90th of 20th century revealed the conflict of interest between large shareholders and small shareholders. The conflict between the control of large shareholders and the interest of medium and small shareholders has gradually become the core problem of corporate governance research. The existed experience research on CEO turnover mainly concentrates on industrialized countries. The research on the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders in transfer economy countries is comparatively not enough.Based on the reasons listed above, the paper, under the framework of imcomplete contracts, on the basis of the two kinds of agency problems, and the double value directions of large shareholders, combining the system background and the latest practice of corporate governance of the Chinese listed firms in the transitional period, from the viewpoint of action motivation of the large shareholders and the agents, carries out the the theoretical analysis and empirical tests of the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders, hoping that this research can provide policy suggestions for bringing CEO turnover mechanism into play effectively, objectively commenting on the other corporate governance mechanism efficiency objectively, and perfecting corporate governance.From the perspective of structure, the paper is divided into the parts of introduction, theoretical basis, system background, empirical research and policy suggestions. In detail, the paper is divided into 9 chapters. The research content and conclusion is as follows:Chapter 1, introduction. The paper first of all gives out the theoretical value and practical significance of the research. Then it outlines the research content, the logic thought, and the research methods. Then it points out the main innovative points of the paper. Finally it defines the key concepts the paper concerned.Chapter 2, the relevant theories of the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders. Because of the incompleteness of the contracts, the asymmetry of information between investors and CEOs, and the limited since of action subjects, the opportunist behavior of the agents is more constant than non-oppertunist. Therefor, the two kinds of principle-agency theories and corporate governance theories based on the incomplete contracts have become the theoretical support of the research.Chapter 3, the system background and turnover trends of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms. From the perspective of marketization reform of the macroscopical system and the property right reform of the microcosmic enterprises, the paper provides detailed system background analysis for the research on the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders. The analysis of the system background shows: the immature, imbalanced market economy condition and the property right which the state share is one and only large shareholder in the microcosmic enterprises have become the path dependence of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms.Chapter 4, the research on the influence of the control of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover. The control of the large shareholders has constructed the microcosmic system restriction of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms. This chapter first of all researches on the influence of the double value direction of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover. Because of this, this chapter empirically testes the the corelation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance,the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders. In doing so, we use corporate performance as the share return of the large shareholders, the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders in the listed firms as the alternantive variable. The finding is:â‘ the CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the corporate performance. Ability hypothesis has got initial evidence.â‘¡Generally, CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders, yet not outstandingly. However, when we divide the groups according to whether the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders is larger than 0, we find that when the Private>0, CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders outstandingly, so that the cahoots hypothesis has got certain empirical support.Then we study the influence of large shareholder character on the CEO turnover. Compared with the small shareholders, the greatest characteristics of the large shareholders lie in that they hold strong control power and influence power on the listed firms depending on their control power. Therefore, we mainly analyze the influence of the level of control right of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover, expecting that the CEO turnover and the control right of the large shareholders have section characteristics. So, we divide the listed firms into closely held corporations, relative control corporations of the large shareholders and the absolute control corporations based on the control power level and test. We find that the CEO turnover of the closely held corporations is negatively corelative to the control power of the large shareholders, yet it has not passed the outstandingness test. Yet the relative control corporations of the large shareholders is positively corelative to the control power level, the CEO turnover of the absolute control corporations is positive coorelative to the control power level, but has not passed the outstandingness test. This proves the hypothesis that the corelation between CEO turnover and the control power of the large shareholders possesses section characteristics to a certain degree.Chapter 5, the study of the influence of the market restriction on the CEO turnover under the control of the large share shareholders. Macroscopical system environment constructs the dependence path of the behaviour choice of the large shareholders. Therfore, combining the system environment the Chinese listed firms face, we empirically test the influence of the market competition of product on the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders. We calculate the HHI which reflects the level of competition of product market of each industry. We expect: CEO turnover is negatively corelative to HHI. First of all, we test the influence of HHI on CEO turnover fron the perspective of the whole samples, and then we test by groups according to the competition strength of the industry. We find that the negative corelation between CEO turnover and HHI is not outstanding. Yet in the high degree competition industries, the relation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance, especially the Major business profit to asset and the governance mechanism of the corporates is more outstanding. This gives indirect support to the hypothesis to a certain degree. Then, we test by dividng groups according to the control power of the ultimate controller and the property right and property right character.We find that the corporate governance effect of market competition is corelative to the efficiency of the signal receiver subjects to a large degree. The closely held corporations are more alert to the market signal.Chapter 6, the research on the economic consequence of the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders. This chapter mainly uses overhead expenses to major business return and running expenses to major business return as the alternative variables of the first kind of agency cost, the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders as the alternative variables of the second kind of agency cost, from the perspective of the change of agency cost and the change of firm performance, tests the economic consequence of the CEO turnover. The research finding is:â‘ CEO turnover, especially the nor turnover helps to ease the agency problem between investors and the managers and the interest conflict between the large shareholders and the medium and small shareholders to a certain degree.But, the achivement has notbeen improved after the CEO turnover. The"Ability Hypothesis"of the CEO turnover has not got absolute support.â‘¡The easing of the agency problem coming from the nor turnover of CEO and the efficiency improvement of the corporate achivements are influenced by the control characteristics of the large shareholders and the outside market restriction intensity. Comparatively speaking, the nor CEO turnover of the closely held corporations play a better role in corporate governance. Under the restriction of market competition, the nor turnover helps more in the improvement of corporate achivements.Chapter 7, the policy enlightment of the CEO turnover research. Based on the research conclusion of the previous chapters, this chapter , by using criterion analytical method, combining the background of property right reform and marketization reform in China, aiming at the problems existed in CEO turnover of the listed firms, proposes the following suggestions:â‘ deepening market reform, lowering the deal cost of signal revelence.â‘¡continuing to perfect the corporate governance mechanism, improving the efficiency of the signal receiving subjects.â‘¢strengthening the formal system restriction of the laws, emphasing the spirit of abing the laws, etc.Chapter 8, research conclusion and the further research direction suggestions. This chapter concludes the research conclusions of the previous chapters and the limitation of the research of the paper. Based on this, it provides further research direction suggestions. We expect that the social network theory may have a greater expection in explaining the CEO turnover, and the use of SME can draw a more dependable conclusion.Compared with the previous research, the innovative points of the paper lie in the following aspects:â‘ The previous research carried out the empirical analysis of the relationship between the CEO turnover and the corporate achievements based on the traditional principal-agency theory and the early corporate govenance theories, and did not take the influence of the double value direction and character of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover into consideration. This paper, From the perspective of the ultimate controller, Firstly , based on the value direction of the large shareholders, tests the corelation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance, the private benefit of the control right of the large shareholders, and by using the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders as the alternative variable, finds that CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders, the existence of the private benefit of the control right weekens the supervision of the large shareholders on CEO.Secondly, we divide the sample corporations into closely held corperations, relative control corporations of the large shareholders and the absolute control corporations, and empically test the influence of the control power level of the large shareholders on CEO turnover by groups.We find that the influence of the control power level of the large shareholders on CEO turnover has got shape of"U".â‘¡This paper mainly test the influence of competition strength of the product market on CEO turnover. We find that under the market restriction, the corporate governance mechanism is more efficient, the inward and outward governance mechanism have complementary effect, different market competition subjects react differently to the market signals. The closely held corporations and the government property right are more alert to the market signals.â‘¢From the perspective of the economic consequence of the CEO turnover, we further test the"Ability Hypothesis"of the CEO turnover. The finding is: to a certain degree, the CEO turnover, especially the nor turnover of the CEO, eases the agency problem. But the corporate performance has not corresponding improvement, and the"Ability Hypothesis"of the CEO has not got absolute support.
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