Research On The Motivation And Economic Consequences Of The Tunneling Of V Company's Large Shareholders

At present,the shareholding structure of the listed companies in China has some prominent characteristics,such as dominant share and high concentration of shareholding rights,Its drawback is that large shareholders infringe on the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders through corporate governance practices.The key is how to solve the inconsistency of interests between large and small shareholders.In the process of corporate governance,large shareholders have absolute control and can take this advantage to tunnel continuously and secretly for their own interests,which damages the interests of minority shareholders and not only affects the long-term development of the company,but also destroys the balance of the market.The behaviors of tunneling has changed from unfair related party transactions,non-compliant capital occupation and related guarantee to more difficult ways of earnings management,equity refinancing,dividend distribution policy and equity pledge.With the gradual development of China's capital market supervision and governance system,the supervision of law enforcement agencies is strengthened gradually,and the behaviors of tunneling of some large shareholders are controlled to a certain extent,but it is still existence.This paper selects a new relatively and representative case--V company's event of tunneling.Based on the asymmetric information,and the theory of catering to dividend and price illusion to analyze the case,and combined with the theory and research results of domestic and foreign scholars on the large shareholders' behaviors of tunneling supplemented by research results of relevant scholars of the indemnification action of V company annual reports,public information,the listed companies' data in the CSMAR database as well as Wind database related data behaviors of large shareholders for analyzing specifically;Then it analyzes deeply the behaviors of tunneling under the policy of equity refinancing and dividend distribution and the reasons and possible influences that lead to the behavior of large shareholders' tunneling.Finally,according to the characteristics of this kind of tunneling,this paper puts forward some specific suggestions from the perspectivesof corporate governance,market supervision and investors.The case of V company just reflects the various problems existing in China's securities market.The government's intervention and continuous high-pressure supervision are inevitable.Large shareholders need to reflect on the risks brought to the company by speculation.To sum up,this article will be on the basis of literature review,with the method of case analysis of theoretical basis,to analyze the behavior of tunneling and possible reasons,the economic consequences of the behavior and the corresponding policy recommendations,to link theory with practice,the regulators,the large shareholders and medium and small investors have a certain degree of heuristic significance.