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Research On Large Shareholders Control And Firm Performance Of Listed Companies Of China

Posted on:2010-07-07Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Z XiongFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360275480013Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Starting from the contact theory, the corporate governance theory and stockownership structure theory, this paper uses system analysis, game analysis and empiricalanalysis to have a further research on the large shareholders control and firmperformance of the listed companies of China, from both qualitative angle andquantitative angle.Under the analysis structure of "stock ownership structure-large shareholderscontrol (large shareholders behaviors)-firm performance", this paper makes somebeneficial exploration and supplementary to the firm performance study, boththeoretical and methodological. The paper studies the relations of "stock ownershipstructure-large shareholders control-firm performance" from three angles: firstly,discussing the relations theoretically and reasoning the logic correlations of "stockownership structure-large shareholders control (large shareholders behaviors)-firmperformance"; secondly, discussing the benefit competition between large and smallshareholders through game analysis; thirdly, making empirical analysis of the relationsbetween the large shareholders and finn performance of the listed companies of China.This paper draws the following conclusions from the study: (1)Shock ownershipsincludes two aspects of "power" and "benefit", respectively represented by power ofstock ownership and benefits of stock ownership; the stock ownership structure is ainternal result interacted by external causes and internal causes rather than anindependent external variable; different firm control is determined by differentstakeholders, among which the manager control is a residual control, a bounded residualcontrol. (2)Building game models to prove that the power owned by large shareholdersand small shareholders are different; the large shareholders concern more about theexistence and development of the firm because they have closer bond with the firm fate,so they have motive to hold firm control rights. (3)The combination of stock ownershipsand control rights is represented by the control of large shareholders. The largeshareholders control is an important approach and medium variable for stocksownership affecting firm performance of the listed companies of China. In empirical analysis, we use two concrete behaviors, investing and tunneling tomeasure the firm behaviors under the large shareholder control and to study therelations of "stock ownership structure-large shareholders control (large shareholdersbehaviors)-firm performance". It is proven empirically that the large shareholder controlis an important approach and medium variable for stocks ownership affecting firmperformance of the listed companies of China. Our results show: between the shareholding proportion of the largest shareholder and firm performance and investmentincrease rate, there exists the thrice function curve relation. The varying trend of thecurve keeps the same direction. There is obvious positive relation between theinvestment increase rate and firm performance. Therefore investment is an importantapproach for the share holding proportion of the largest shareholder impacting firmperformance.In the final part of the paper, we study the supporting behavior and tunnelingbehavior of the Star Electricity as an example. We study the relations among the stockownership structure, investment, tunneling and firm performance. The results show thatthe investment behavior supported by the large shareholder may benefit the firmperformance increase; while the tunneling behaviors of the large shareholders maydecrease the firm performance. Severe external monitor may attack the illegal behaviorof the large shareholder, and promote the function of stock ownership balancing, thus toimprove the firm performance.
Keywords/Search Tags:stock ownership structure, corporate governance, large shareholder control, firm performance
PDF Full Text Request
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