Choice Of Vertical Strucutre And Contract Under Chain To Chain Competition Based On Price And Service

Current research literature about supply chain management mainly answer what arethe performance benchmark of single supplier and multiple retailers, how to realize theoptimal performance benchmark through coordination contract.However, theperformance benchmark of single chain have been the key problem under chain to chaincompetition.The most basic and important form of competitive supply chians arecomprised of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers, the questions such as,forexample, is the vertical integration structure still efficient as the performacebenchmark under chain to chain competition? Can some important contract mechanismsreally improve the single supply chain performance? Espically, when to introducecontract to improve supply chain performance? Those formal answers to those questionswill motivate the development of new supply chain theory.This thesis applies cooperative and non-cooperative theory to study systemticaUyvertical dominant control structure and choice of coordination contract under chain tochain competition comprised of two manufacturers and exclusive retailers, all thoseresults will extend the traditional govemace mechanism theory of supply chainmanagement,which also provide new acedimical basis and actual direction forimprovement of competitive supply chain.First, this thesis provides structure models of chain to chain comprised of twomanufacturers and two exclusive retailers, the purpose is to disclose the impact of pricecompetition and service competition as well as service cost on the vertical controlstructure,to identify the structure characteristcs of different cost level on high ormedium or low states.Secondly, the research is to answer the dominant vertical control structure of chainto chain competition on the difference of cost and substitutability, how about theinfluence of asymmetric cost structure on the control structure? How about therelationship between control modes and industrial equilibrium? When is prisonerdilemma possible?Third, author will solve the problems such as how the demand uncertainty and product competition influence the wholesale price and retail price as well as revenue ofmanufacturers and retailers? How the return polices is designed to ensure the win-win performance under the combination strategies of clearance pricing or optimalpricing at low demand state? When return policy intensifies the competition ofmanufacturer or mitigate the competition? When to choose combination strategies ofclearance pricing or optimal pricing at low demand state?Fourth, this thesis analyze the parameter range and characteristics of win-winperformance for the delegation comprised of three tariff contract mechanism under priceand service competition supply chain, to identify the impact of price and service onthe delegation and industrial equilibrium.Finally, author focuses on the quantity discount contract choice and parameterdesign under chain to chain competition with unobservable vertical contract,furthermore, to identify the impact of price and service competition on the quantitydiscount contract perforamce.