Reverse Supply Chain Modeling For Remanufacturable Products: Pricing, Contracts And Coordination

The main topic of this research is to study the reverse supply chain management in the two basic questions: return products pricing strategy and the cooperation of supply chain management.In this paper, researched initially on the return products pricing strategy. To gain maximum expected profit, the pricing model of remanufactured products is proposed from the perspective of remanufacturer. Then the optimized pricing equation is drawn under the condition that demand is a Poisson process and reservation price is exponential distribution, and use the analytic method to get the optimal price of a complete and comprehensive nature, and at last, use arithmetic example to verify and interpret the nature.And then from a single model of decision-makers to expand to a closed-loop supply chain composed of "a single re-manufacturers - a single retailer". And that, in a single cycle environment, studies the Optimal pricing strategy of the concentrate decision-making and decentralized decision-making, when there is difference between new product pricing and remanufactured product pricing. And by analysis, get the conclusion that return products have more cost savings, the more it can act to stimulate the return efforts and to increase the profit of the closed-loop supply chain members no matter concentrate decision-making or decentralized decision-making. At the same time, found that sales quantity of new products and return quantity of used products both lose 50%, and the relative value of the lost profits for 25% in the entire closed-loop supply chain system, and then a two-part tariff contract to coordinate pricing strategies in pursuit of the supply chain as a whole the greatest gains.Based on retailer's effort dependent the product quantity of return, and the product quantity of return is stochastic, the coordination of the whole price contract, revenue sharing contract, rebate and penalty contract and two-part tariff contract coordinated the reverse supply chain were analyzed. It was proved that whole price contract and revenue sharing contract had the unicity of allocating the reverse supply chain profit and therefore could not coordinate reverse supply chain, rebate and penalty contract remedied the limitation of the whole contract and two-part tariff contract remedied the limitation of penalty contract, so they could coordinate the reverse supply chain effectively.In the case that return of used products rely on the retailers efforts and random collection of return products, studies the coordination issue of reverse supply chain composed by "a single manufacturer - a single retailer," under the existence of asymmetric information situation. Under Recovery quantity dependent on the efforts of retailers and the random circumstances, However, due to asymmetric information, the manufacturer couldn't observe the retailer's action, the immoral action came into being so as to affect the collaboration of the whole reverse supply chain. To deal with this problem, the game between manufacturer and retailer was studied from the point of principal-agency theory.Under symmetric information, different parameter's effect on the collection effort level of the retailer was analyzed. And under asymmetric information, the parameters terms to ensure the validity of linear contract were discussed by the especial illustration.Finally, we will further expand to the reverse supply chain composed by "a single manufacturer - the two retailers," from the model of "a single re-manufacturers - a single retailer," and the retailer is responsible for product sales and return of used products. in Forward channels, existing price competition between retailers; in the reverse channel, return quantity of used products rely on the retailers efforts. Revenue-sharing contracts used to achieve coordination as well as rational distribution of profits among the members of the reverse supply chain. Finally, using the numerical example illustrates the conclusion; the results show a revenue sharing contract can realize Pareto optimal of the multi-parties.