| This dissertation is on the relationship between the interests of state and property rights protection. The following questions are tried to be answered in this paper: First, when the state has its own interests, what is the motivation of the state's transfer from acquiring monopoly rent to suppling public goods, including property rights protection? Second,What are the characteristics of the change of property rights protection levels pushed by government? And what is the impact of this characteristic on efficiency? Will the improvement of property rights protection pushed by government be self-enforced and surstained? Those questions were answered by reseaching on the changes of outside investors protection levels in Chinese security market.Investor protection refers to protecting outside investors against expropriation from controlling shareholders by law. Existed studies focusing on developed capital market found that, there is a positive relationship between investor protection level and resources distribution efficiency. Countries with a higher investor protection level are just the same with higher resources distribution efficiency. Most listed companies are former state-owned enterprises, and the choice of investor protection to a great extent is the tradeoff of state's private interest as a controlling shareholder and social surplus as public goods supplier. So investor protection is quite different from that in foreign countries. Research on this specific characteristics of investor protection is significant for extending the fields of property rights protection, and is also helpful for searching the relationship beween state's interests and property rights protection, enriching the current state theory and property rights theory.The main clue of the papers is as follows: At first, the investor protection and its change path in government-pushed security market was described, and by an empirical research, the impact of investor protection level's change path on security market efficiency was analyzed. Meanwhile, a theoretical explanation for the change of investor protection level in Chinese security market was followed. And the theoretical logic of the state on selecting investor protection level was emphasized. At last, the theoretical relationship between the state's interests and property rights protection were refined.The main contents are as follows:Chapter 1 is intruduction, the main concepts were explained and research methods were introduced;Chapter 2 is a literatures review: one part is about the relationship between investor protection level and resources distribution efficiency, the other is about literatures on the role of state in property rights protection. And relevant literatures are on the indexs of investor protection, the influence of investor protection level on various variables in security market and determinants of investor protection levels, and there are also some literatures on why the state protect property rights, how efficiency is influenced by the state's defination and enforcement of property rights.In Chapter 3, a brief introduction about the composition of investor protection, the enforcement of investor rights and influence factors of investor protection were given, and the two roles of state in the investor protection was emphasized.In Chapter 4 the characteristics of government-pushed security market and the natures of investor protection in this market were analyzed, and found that the state adjusts investor protection levels according to its own interests, which induced a fluctuation of the investor protection level during its wholly upward trend. Furthermore, the fluctuation of investor protection level had an impact on the security market efficinecy: when the investor protection was improved, so as the efficiency; and when investor protection was adverse, the efficency deteriorated.In Chapter 5 I tried to give a theoritical explanation for the change of investor protection level in Chinese security market. At first, the state's interests was defined as the composition of monopoly rent interests and tax revenue induced by social surplus, and the former is negatively related with the level of investor protection, and tha later is positively related with the level of investor protection. The institutional change of security market was pushed by the encompassing interests of the strong government, and when the interests group in the security market is not strong enough to match with the state, the state decide the level of investor protection according to its interests and the investors' participate constrains, so there is a low level of investor protection controlled by government during the initial period of security market. With the development of security market, it played a more and more important role in the economy growth and so, the state can benefit more from the resources distribution function of security market. Simultaneouly there is a resistance from the interests groups when the government expropriated the investors' rights, so investor protection was improved. But because of the absence of institutional constrains on the state's acquiring of monopoly rent, the government will expropriate investors' rights when it is urgent, so there is a fluctuation of investor protection levels.By research on the change of investor protection level, we can re-think the interests of the state and its relationship with property rights protection. There is a tradeoff beteween the two parts of state interests. When the cost of occupying monopoly rent interests was upward, the state has a motivation of make a substitution. And whether the state will replace monopoly rent with social surplus induced by improved property right or not, depends on the state's capacity of aquiring resources after its release of rights. So a strong government is necessary for the release of rights from tha hand of power, but it is also an abstacle for the sustaining improvement of property rights. The change of investor protection level proved that, it can be self-enforced for investors acquire more rights from the hand of power because the state has an encompassing interests. The gradual transition pushed by the government with administrative method can improve efficiency to some extent, which was supported by the improvement of investors' negotiation capacity. But the formal rules for constraining the power of state is necessary for the sustaining improvement of efficinecy. Those conclusions is a extending of the relationship between state theory and property rights theory.In chapter 6 there is a conclusion, and some suggestions were put forward on improvement of investor protection.The core idea of this paper are as follows: In the security market pushed by government, investor protection levels was adjusted by government according to its own interests, there is a fluctuations of investor protection level during its improvement process, which induced the fluctuation of security market efficiency.The core idea was verified by analysis on the change process of investor protection level in Chinese security market. The main conclusions of this papers is that, one part of state's interests is to some extent conformed to the other, and can be substituted each other. When the cost of benefit from monopoly rent is upward, the state will be motivated to bagin an institutional change, so that property protection level will be improved, and resources distribution improved, which means there will be a substitution of different parts of the state's interests. It is the encompassing interests of the strong government that make it possible for the rights to be released from the power, and the improvemet of property rights will be strengened by the incresing negotiation capacity of interest groups during the institutional change. But it is just the same power of state that prevents the surstained improvement of property rights protection level. A surstaining improvement of property protection level depends on the interaction between economic institution and political institution. This theoretical explanation is helpful for re-understanding the relationship between the state's interests and property rights protection, and it ia a extending and enrichment of state theory and property rights protection theory.The major contributions of this paper is: Firstly, there is a innovation in study angle. As far as the current studies are concerned, investor protection were researched from the corporate governance point of view, and investor protection was viewed as defination and enforcement of law to protect outside invesors against expropriation of controlling shareholders. In this dissertation, the influence of state's interests on investor protection was emphasized in a macro and institutional change view; Secondly, the current conclusion was renewed. By searching the relationship between investor protection level and security market efficiency in China's security market, I get a different conclusion from that of current studies. Furthermore, the current theory is extended. A theoretical model was constructed for explanation of investor protection level and its change. Based on this, state interests and its relationship with property rights protection was re-explained. By this, the judgment of new institutional economy on state's selecting property rights protection level was verifed. Furthermore, it was indicated exquisitely that, once the confirmation and improvement of property rights bagins, it can be self-strengened.The shortages of this research is that, the impact of investor protection level on the resources distribution efficiency in the real economy was not studied for the reason of data availability; and the theoritical explanation of this research still need to be further empirically tested.This research can be deepened in the fields such as, the impact of the local governments' interests on investor protection and the impact of interest groups' lobby on investor protection.
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