The Research On The Property Rights System Reform Of China's State-Owned Commerical Bank

As the most basic and most important factor affecting business and development of the commercial banks, and is tested in practical field.The property rights system is the basic link and the logical starting point to promote the reform and development of commercial banks. At present, the conclusion that the system of private-owned property rights is more efficient than that of state-owned property rights is generally accepted by theorists and is also tested in practical field. Against the background of the deepening of economic globalization, the intensive impact of foreign banks and the emergence of financial risks, the research on reform of property rights system of state-owned commercial banks is of highly practical and theoretical significance to long-term development of the commercial banks, the safety and health of the financial system and even the stability and development of the whole society.The paper states the previous researches on this issue and gives a comprehensive analysis and logical summary of the researches made by experts from home and abroad. The problems are classified into the following four types: property rights and property rights system, commercial bank corporate governance, principal - agent relationship of state-owned commercial banks and the issues related reform of property rights system of the state-owned commercial bank. Based on the analysis and summary, the paper also offers the targeted evaluation.This paper systematically introduces the formation and development of the modern property rights theory, the principal-agent theory and the corporate governance theory, definites the property rights and property rights system, clarifies the internal and external principal-agent relationships of the state-owned commercial banks, discusses the specialty of the corporate governance of commercial banks, finally concludes logic relationships among property rights system of the state-owned commercial banks, principal-agent relationship and corporate governance and puts forward the theory route and research framework, which is property ownership is a bunch of combinations of rights whose core is ownership, the separation of ownership and management led to the principal-agent problems, information asymmetry between the clients and the agents led to corporate governance problems. It is obvious that the arrangement of property right system of the state-owned commercial banks is not only the logic starting point for the research of principal-agent and the problems of corporate governance but also is the end result to solve the problems of principal-agent and corporate governance.On the basis of above-mentioned research, the paper analyses deeply principal-agent relationships, corporate governance structure and the model of property rights system of the state-owned commercial banks in accordance with the logical framework put forward. This article follows the ideas put forward by Holmstrom (1971) in bilateral principal-agent theory, and according to the assumption in this model that the degree of absolute risk aversion is unchanged (The preference of operators for risk is risk aversion or risk-neutral), has established theory model of the principal-agent relationship of the State-owned commercial banks. The paper reached to the conclusion by analysis: to restore the main character of the market of the state-owned commercial banks, to establish an effective incentive mechanism complemented by the necessary regulatory measures, to introduce the new owners only for the goal of cost-effective can improve efficiency of principal-agent relationship.When studying the problems concerning corporate governance of the state-owned commercial banks, this paper firstly establishes an evaluation system on corporate governance of commercial banks combining the quantitative and qualitative indicators, on this basis, describes the present situation on corporate governance of the state-owned commercial bank with FA-PCA comprehensive evaluation model of multiple statistical analysis and explore the choice of mode of governance of state-owned commercial banks from building the model of both choice of acts and control of moral risks, so as to come up: the state-owned commercial banks should adopt the common governance-style corporate governance model combined internal control and external control.On the research of the reform of property rights system of the state-owned commercial banks, on the basis of analysis and evaluation of the three systems of property rights, this paper puts forward the evolutionary reform on property rights system of the state-owned commercial banks. The evolutionary reform suggests the structure of property rights of the state-owned commercial banks progressively be transformed from state-owned majority shareholding to state-owned relative shareholding and then to the pluralism and privatization of state equity participation. Specifically, state-owned relative shareholding property rights system model should be set up in the short run while Country equity diversification, privatization" property rights system model in the long run. Then, from the aspects of the enrichment and improvement of "Temasek" model of Central Huijin Investment, gradually reducing national holdings, carefully introducing domestic and foreign strategic investors, using "save-for-equity" approach to increase the proportion of the public shareholding, as well as introducing "golden share" mechanism to ownership structure of the state-owned commercial bank, gives some building measures to property rights model of the Chinese state-owned commercial banks.This paper takes China Construction Bank as an example. On the basis of comparison to foreign commercial banks on the arrangements of structure of property rights and the design of structure of corporate governance, the paper analyzes problems in these two of the current CCB deeply. At last, under the guidance of conclusion put forward by the second part, the paper brings forward recommendations to optimize structure of property rights and corporate governance of CCB according to special features of the bank.