Tax Collection Game And Incentive Mechanism

Taxation came into being with the eshtablishment of a country, in all ages, a compulsive liability of taxpayers imposed upon by the government. It is difficult for the government to banlance the economic benefits between the nation and the people. The unremitting efforts for respective interests lead to many levels game in the domain of tax in existence. The course of taxation levy and management consists of a series of principal-agent relations. It forms a principal-agent chain that moves downward from each level and in a link with one another. Since the tax system reforms in 1994, the tax revenue of our nation has achieved a high-speed growth by an average of 17.3% a year and topped 6000 billion RMB in 2008. However, the phenomenen of tax non-compliance, low level tax service, taxpayer incentive mechanism misplacement and so on emerge one after another in taxation levy and management practice.On the basis of this background, the thesis researches into and analyzes the affairs (tax evasion and tax avoidance) and peoples (tax-collector, taxpayer and certified tax agent) in taxation levy and management with the help of the theory and methods related to the game theory and incentive mechanism design. The concerned analyses of the Bayesian equilibrium and separating equilibrium are conducted by establishing the mathematical models in order to make suggestions for the reform of tax levy and management. The great effort is made to raise the tax compliance level and taxation levy and management efficiency, and bring forth new ideas to the theoretic researches and guidelines for the practice in taxation.This thesis consists of ten chapters as follows:The first chapter mainly sets forth the background and significance of this thesis, the research train of thought, content and frame, methods, characteristics and innovation in the thesis.The second chapter mainly summarizes the achievements in research of the tax levy and management at home and abroad. The results reveal that the researches abroad lay special emphasis on the establishment of the mathematical models to analyze the problems in taxation practices. But those models are always based on some rigid supposed conditions, which are far from the reality in China. So it will take a long time to directly apply these achievements in research of the reality in our country. The researches abroad mainly concentrated on the income tax compliance because of the national conditions of the researchers. On the contrary, the researches for taxation levy and management at home are still in the early stage, totally in the extensive type, which remaines to be further studied regardless of the theory and practice.The third chapter reviews the historical course of tax levy and management models and the system changes of tax levy and management law in China, and analyzes the changes of the tax revenue and the characteristics of taxation levy and management in our nation. The deficiency and problems in taxation levy and management work are pointed out. On the basis of the experience of developed countries for reference, some proposals about perfecting our country's tax levy and management system are put forward.The fourth chapter summarizes the tax evasions, concerning the concept, characteristics, techniques, harm, punishment and the bad effects of tax evasions in China. The deepest causes of tax evasion due to the interests, the culture and the tax law system are analyzed. The game relations between the taxpayers and the tax-collectors are analyzed by establishing the corresponding mathematical models and finding the solutions to the models. Some countermeasures about optimizing tax levy and management are put forward.The fifth chapter analyzes the risks in tax planning and stresses the recognizing risks, which means that tax planning scheme is thought of as wholly rational and legal by the taxpayers, but is thought of as tax evasion by the tax authority. On this basis, the corresponding game models are established, the solutions found, the decision-making behaviors and the equilibrium results in the game course between the companies and tax authority analyzed, some specific measures for improving the results raised.The sixth chapter mainly discusses the tax avoidance and anti-tax avoidance in the international scope. In order to resist such kind of tax avoidance, most countries authorise the taxation bureaus to adjust transfer pricing on arm's length principle. As a result, corresponding game models are established to analyze the decision-making behaviors and the equilibrium results of multinational companies and taxation bureaus. Some countermeasures for anti-tax avoidance are put forwarded.The seventh chapter analyzes the principal-agent relations between the taxation bureaus and tax-collectors. Using the Holmstrom and Milgrom model for reference, the principal-agent model between taxation bureaus and tax-collector is designed. Some suggests for perfecting our country's tax-collector incentive mechanism are put forward.The eighth chapter analyzes the principal-agent relations between taxpayers and certified tax agents, choosing the cost ratio of pay taxes as the variable reflecting certified tax agents efficiency, using the Laffont model to design the incentive contract for certified tax agents with different abilities. Against the problems in tax agent industry, a conception for perfecting our country's tax agent system is formed.The ninth chapter analyzes the problems of misplacements and gaps in terms of tax incentive mechanism. In view of the experience of Japan and Taiwan District, two tax incentive systems are designed and proved, by the method of game theory, to be effective for reducing tax evasions. A plan is advanced to carry out the blue report system in China.The tenth chapter summarized the important conclusions of the whole thesis, pointing out the limits and suggestions in further researches.This paper is characteristic of tax levy and management researches with the help of the game theory and incentive mechanism theory. Creative points: First, the game rearches of tax levy and management is extended from our country's taxation domain to the international scope. Second, the area of the game rearches is explored in the tax planning. Third, the game theory proves that effective reduction of tax evasions be realized by effective taxpayer incentive mechanism.