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Based On The Principal-agent Theory, The Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of The Responsible Persons Of Zhengzhou Municipal Management Enterprises

Posted on:2020-10-15Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:T LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330575960019Subject:Business administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the reform and opening up,with the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises,the incentive mechanism of the responsible persons of state-owned enterprises has also been gradually established.Zhengzhou city management enterprises synchronized with the domestic economic system reform,has initially established the principal-agent relationship between investors and the responsible persons of state-owned enterprises.However,Zhengzhou management enterprises are still faced with more administrative intervention,imperfect incentive mechanism and so on.In the face of domestic and foreign competitive pressure,it is necessary to strengthen the research on the incentive mechanism of Zhengzhou municipal management enterprises.Guided by Marxist economic theory,this paper uses literature analysis,comparative analysis and case study.Firstly,this paper defines the basic concepts of municipal management enterprises and heads of state-owned enterprises,and clarifies the research objects;secondly,it combs and evaluates the principal-agent theory,human capital theory and incentive theory to determine the theoretical basis of the research;thirdly,the paper combs out the historical origin,development status and common problems of municipal management enterprises in Zhengzhou with the help of historical analysis method.Then,the paper focuses on the selection mechanism,assessment mechanism,restraint mechanism and salary incentive mechanism of Zhengzhou Municipal Enterprise Manager,and analyses the existing problems and causes of the problems.Finally,the paper puts forward suggestions for improving the incentive mechanism of Zhengzhou Municipal Enterprise Manager.The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in: first,expand the research object of principal-agent theory.From the property right attribute,the municipal management enterprise belongs to the state-owned enterprise,but its property right subordinate,function orientation,supervision authority,governance mode and so on are different from the middle management enterprise and the provincial management enterprise.This paper mainly focuses on the principal-agent problem of the municipal management enterprise.Second,put forward new suggestions to improve the incentive mechanism of Zhengzhou management enterprises.The policy suggestions put forward in this paper,such as improving the selection mechanism of responsible persons,improving the assessment and management mechanism,perfecting the corporate governance structure,carrying out a comprehensive salary system,and so on,timely echo the new concept of state-owned enterprise governance put forward by the central government since the 18 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.A new policy.
Keywords/Search Tags:Principal agent, Municipal management enterprise, Incentive mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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