A Study On The Audit Opinion Shopping In China's Securities Markets

Audit Opinion Shopping (AOS) directly influents the trueness, usefulness of accounting information, the protection of securities markets order and the interests of property owners, It has an important theoretical value and practical significance for the monitoring of independent audit industry as well as the formation of sound order in securities markets to explore the conduct characteristics and rules of AOS under specific environment and the dynamic transition of securities markets.This dissertation follows the logic of "Incentives-Motivation-Behavior-Governance", combines theories and methodes of the new institutional economics, the co-evolution economics, the evolution game theory, it bases on the securities markets environment since 2004, selected China's A-share listed companies of year 2004 to 2008 as the research sample and made application of the multinomial logistic and ordinal logistic model in the process of empirical examination.The whole framework of the dissertation bases on motivation theory, it makes distinction between the institution-related and institution-unrelated factors of securities markets in our country, and analyzes AOS incentives from the perspectives of principal-agent theory, contract theory, transaction cost theory, property rights theory. Then it turns to analyze the AOS needs and the capital markets related and unrelated motivations which are initiated from the AOS needs. The empirical examines show motivations derived from capital markets, debt contract and management salary are significant, changing auditors, audit fees and nonaudit fees are probable routes to shop audit opinion. Further empirical tests indicates listed companies could successfully shop audit opinion by changing auditors, paying higher audit (include relative high audit fees and abnormal greatly increased audit fees) or nonaudit fees, or combining changing auditors with the one of the other routes.Audit techniques and audit commitment institutes are two significant factors influenting AOS. Both the game theory analysis and empirical examination show that the AOS motivation won't be weakened in the initial stage of techniques transition, the game theoretical analysis also suggests the AOS be suppressed to some extent as auditors get familiar with the new techniques. The pattern of the exertion of the right to audit commission has important influence on AOS. The analysis from the perspective of evolution game theory of two typical models as the property owners excising the right or the management levels excising it shows that the former is prior to the latter. The empirical examine focus on the central enterprises which have reformed the model from the latter to the former also supports the argument. A model of separating the selection right from the employment of auditor is put up, which is proved to be comprise as well as realistic choice of enterprises out of the central one as it takes into account the audit market order and protecting the interests of property owners, and is in line with the cost and benefits principle.At last, a view of "co-evolutional governance" is suggested. The existing governance views related to AOS are essentially "institution related" and pay no attention to the effect of audit techniques on the AOS governance. The analysis of the independent audit system from the perspective of co-evolution theory shows it pocesses all characteristics of a co-evolutional system, and the co-evolutional relations between the audit techniques and institution, the independent audit system and the social environment, the organizations and individuals in this system, so that a view of co-evolutional governance which is more comprehensive and systematic could be applied in the governance of AOS, so as to improve the effciency and effectiveness of govenance.