A Study On Incentive Mechanism Of Intra-industry Cooperative R&D With Sharing Arrangement And Alliance Structure

Under the highly competitive business environment, the rapid development of science and technology makes the production changing faster, consumer demand changing and market competition intensifying need the corporation's continuity new product development. However, there are so many uncertainty factors in the development of complex products, so it has high R&D risk. Only relying on limited internal skills and resources to carry on R&D activities, it becomes increasingly difficult. In order to reduce risk and increase the success rate of new production, the companies inclined to form R&D alliances to carry on R&D.Cooperative R&D can bring on many benefits, such as: sharing information and research results, improving development efficiency, reducing and sharing risks and costs of R&D, ensuring innovation organizational flexibility, and forming synergies and so on. But there are also some problems, due to the externalities of innovation, high-tech risks and costs and some other factors, most R&D activities ended with failure. Product Development and Management Association study found that the current new product development success rate was only 59%. There are little or no input moral risks of the union members; the unreasonable allocation of the benefits also is the main factors of R&D alliance instability. So how to reduce the moral hazard of the members, increase the amount of R&D investment is the key to success of cooperative R&D and market competition.Considering the status of the Union moral hazard and unreasonable allocation of the benefits, the paper establishes a cooperative R&D game model under the different distribution patterns and different coalition structure .By studying the effect of the conditions such as technology risk and investment spillover on the investment strategy of alliance members, under the different distribution and alliance structure, exploring the optimal collaborative R&D model under the different market environment, designing investment incentives mechanisms of alliance members, in order to make alliance member voluntarily reduce the speculation driven by self-interest behavior, in order to avoid moral hazard, incentive to invest more R&D resources, promote the success of cooperative R&D, and provide theoretical guidance in developing strategies or policies for enterprises, universities, research institutions and government research and administrative departments. In real economic life, or research in the literature, there are many organizations forms of production activities mainly based on collaborative R&D. Common classification is based on whether all parties of the cooperation adopt the shareholding system. So usually the form is divided into equity cooperative R&D organizations and non-equity cooperative R&D organization. R&D alliance structure of this paper consists of parallel R&D alliances and concentration R&D alliance, as well as earning distribution consists of average distribution and distribution according to the proportion of input. Parallel R&D alliance refers to the non-equity cooperative R&D organization based on cross-license agreement, alliance members rely on their own independent research and resource, and finally the two sides share their research results under the cross-license Concentration R&D alliance is an equity cooperative R&D organization, in which alliance members shares a certain percentage of the shares according to the resource input .While in the average distribution, all market earning will be divided equally to each alliance members regardless of how much each has invested in to R&D, while in the other station , each member according to the proportion of the member input accounting for the league total input distributes their market earning.The main chapters of this article are the third, the forth, the fifth, the contents are as follows:Chapter III studies the cooperation alliance structure and distribution within stalemate industry revenue. the game model of parallel R&D alliances and concentration R&D alliance are built in the average allocation and proportional allocation, according to study the R&D investment strategies of the alliance members under the different alliance structure and interest distribution, the optimal model of cooperative R&D was explored in the different market environment, besides, R&D investment incentives mechanism was designed for alliance members to guard against moral hazard R&D alliance.Chapter IV studies on R&D alliances structure and distribution based on the spillover effects within the industry cooperation. The chapter mainly on account of the existence of the exchange of information between enterprises in the R&D process, and spillover effects of investment caused by research staff turnover. Investment strategy is also focused on in the average allocation and proportion distribution of the alliance members each in the Parallel R&D alliances and Concentration R&D alliance, in order to analysis the impact of R&D investment spillover, the alliance structure and distribution form on the investment strategy of the alliance members, and explore the optimal cooperative R&D model in different market environment.Chapter V is the study on the alliance structure and distribution based on the technology risk within the industry cooperation. The paper main considers the existence of technical risk in the R&D process, based on which, cooperation game model of the parallel alliances and Concentration R&D alliance are respectively established in the average distribution and proportion distribution. By studying the different structures and different benefits allocations, as well as investment strategy of the alliance members in the different technical risk and market conditions, alliance member investment incentives mechanisms are designed.The innovations of the papers on the theoretical and methodological are as follows:â‘ Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, this paper establishs a game model based on rally gains of the industry cooperation in R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environmentâ‘¡Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, the existense of investment spillover effect among members. The paper establishs a game model based on spillover effects of industry cooperation in R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environmentâ‘¢Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, and a technical risk when R & D. The paper establishs a game model based on technical risk of cooperative R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environment...