Risk-Sharing,Strategic Investment And Government Subsidy With Supply Uncertainty

With the increasing trend of economic globalization,the supply chain system grows more complex and supply uncertainty,which is relevant in various industries,attracts firms more attention.To reduce the loss caused by supply uncertainty risk,firms can sign an appropriate contract with the supplier or decrease the supplier's supply uncertainty by investment.In addition,when supply uncertainty affects consumers' necessities,the government needs to intervene to avoid the unrest.To decrease the damage brought by supply uncertainty to firms and society,from the perspective of risk-sharing,strategic investment and government subsidy,this dissertation investigates how firms and the government manage supply uncertainty.The detailed contents are as follows.This dissertation studies the manufacturer's strategy to share risk with the supplier in a supply chain with supply uncertainty.Consider a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a supplier,where the supplier is subject to random yield,leading to supply uncertainty.When the manufacturer commits to share risk with the supplier,he provides a subsidy to the supplier's emergency production.Set up a principal-agent model,where the manufacturer is the principal and the supplier is the agent;derive the optimal wholesale price contract and risk-sharing contract;explore whether the manufacturer needs to share risk with the supplier.The results show that risk-sharing benefits both the manufacturer and the supplier under certain conditions.Additionally,asymmetric information does always harm the manufacturer but benefit the supplier regardless of whether or not the manufacturer shares risk.Whereas,risk-sharing can weaken the harm of asymmetric information to the manufacturer and enhance the benefit of asymmetric information on supplier.This dissertation explores the strategy of the manufacturers with Cournot competition to invest to a common supplier in a supply chain system with supply uncertainty.Consider two manufacturers engaging in Cournot competition and one supplier with supply uncertainty.To lower the supplier's supply uncertainty,the manufacturers can invest the common supplier.However,when the manufacturer invests the supplier,there will be spillover effect,which reduces the supplier's uncertainty for his competitor and increases his competitor's competitiveness.Develop a two-stage game model and derive the manufacturers' optimal order quantities and investment strategy equilibrium.The analyses for the spillover effect,competitive degree and cost advantage are conducted.The results show that the manufacturer with cost advantage does not always choose to reduce the supplier's supply uncertainty.Finally,the impact of different investment decision is analyzed.This dissertation investigates the government's strategy to subsidize the supplier and the manufacturer in a supply chain system with supply uncertainty.Consider a supply chain system consisting of one supplier,one or two manufacturer(s)and an external market.When the profit brought by the external market exceeds that brought by the manufacturer,the supplier will provide the raw material to the external market,which causes supply uncertainty to the manufacturer(s)and harms the consumers.Facing these problems,the government should take measures to subsidize the supplier or the manufacturer(s).Establish a game model where the upstream supplier and the downstream manufacturer(s)engage in Stackelberg game and the downstream competitive manufacturers engage in Nash game.Analyze the different subsidy strategies with one monopoly manufacturer and two duopoly manufacturers,separately.The analysis of equilibrium results shows that,compared to the subsidy to the supplier,the subsidy to the manufacturer(s)always benefits the supply chain members more.Besides,it is found that competition enhances the possibility of supply disruption and increases the government's subsidy cost.