The Study On Financial Behavior Of Executives In State-owned Enterprise

State-owned enterprise is an important micro-structure driving Chinese economic development. But its survival and growth needs the executives ability and the executives spirit, especially, under the condition that China's market system has become more perfect and the market competion has become more severe. But in the realistic world, we can find some executives of state-owned enterprise harm to enterprise's value because of their selfish which means that entrepreneur is an economic man. Entrepreneur's selfish financial behavior prevent him from behaving on the behalf of stockholders. At the same time, we also can observe some responsible financial behavior of executives which can maintain the interests of the enterprise and the stakeholders, such as the shareholders, the employees, creditors, consumers and so on. But from the existing literature, we can't find much of the research literature about executives's financial behavior which based on the social duty motivation. Therefore, based on the different theories such as the principal-agent theory, Marx's theory of human nature, maslow's hierarchy theory of needs and the financial theory about operators etc, this paper chooses to study the executives's financial behavior which based on the motives of the agent and also study the executives's financial behavior which based on the motives of the social responsibility.This study whether in theory or in practice are quite important significance. From the view of theory, based on the background of Chinese economic transformation reform and using the data of state-owned listed companies,this paper verifies executives's over-investment behavior and on-the-job consumption behavior, so as to enrich empirical research on the theory of literature. Combined with the special case of state-owned enterprises in China and based on the practice of state-owned enterprises, this paper also proposes the theoretical framework of the executives's financial behavior which encroaches on the state-owned assets. Moreover, this paper also theoretically analyzes the executives's financial behavior which based on the motives of the social responsibility. From the view of the practice, on the one hand this paper can find some useful control factors which can help state-owned enterprises govern executives's selfish financial behavior. On the other hand, our study also provides theoretical basis and practical incentives to the executives's financial behavior which based on the motives of the social responsibility.The main content in the paper includes:Part one:We propose some basic theory using them to analyzes executives's financial behavior and discuss research summary of executives's financial behavior. In this part, this research is expounded from the theoretical basis, and it also discuss behavior connotation, behavior characteristic, behavior expression and the value relationship of executives's financial behavior.Part two:This article analyzes theoretically and empirically over-investment behavior of executives. On one hand, it analyzes theoretically the over-investment behavior's concept, characteristics, and its consequences, motives,the measure ways and so on. On the other hand, it also analyzes empirically executives's characteristics's influence to over-investment behavior, and over-investment behavior's influence to the company's performance.Part three:This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically on-the-job consumption behavior of executives. First, it analyzes theoretically the on-the-job consumption behavior's concept, characteristics, and its economic consequences, motives, the measure ways and so on. Second,it construct economic models to test whether free cash flow influences executives's on-the-job consumption behavior, and also analyzes empirically to find whether companies's conrestriction mechanism influence executives's on-the-job consumption behavior.Part four:This research theoretically analyzes the executives's financial behavior which encroaches on the state-owned assets. First, it analyzes the concept of encroaching on the state-owned assets, and find the essence of encroaching on the state-owned assets is to obtain the private benefits from management authority. Second, it finds eight common modes of encroaching on the state-owned assets, which contains corrupting or diverting funds, bribery with enterprise assets, covert management-buy-outs, Sale of state-owned assets and so on. Third,it also proposes three kinds of encroaching effect, suchas economic effect, social effect, legal effect.Finally,it discuss factors of encroaching on the state-owned assets,containing executives's personality traits,social integrity, internal property rights system, compensation mechanism and external macro environment in the capital market, professional manager market, property market and external audit supervision strength.Part Five:This research analyzes the executives's financial behavior which based on social responsibility.First,the paper expounds the background and humanity basis for social background accounting concept of social responsibility.Second,it points out the way to realize executives's financial behavior which based on social responsibility.Third,it also analyzes factors affecting the behavior choice.Finally, combined with examples,the paper analyzes specifically the executives's financial behavior which based on social responsibility in "5.12 WenChuan earthquake".Part Six:The paper studies the ways to govern the executives's financial behavior.lt suggests restricting the executives's financial behavior based on the motives of the agent and encouraging the executives's financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility.The main innovation in the paper:First, under the theoretical guidance to materialistic dialectics,the paper proposes the "dual character" of executives's financial behavior,and overcome one-sidedness of traditional "unified theory". At the present, Chinese and overseas scholars only discuss the executives's financial behavior based on the motives of the agent,no literature about the executives's financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility.Based on this current situation, the paper proposes the executives's financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility,which develops a new field of research vision.Second,this paper analyzes empirically executives's characteristics's influence to over-investment behavior,which finds the way to curb over-investment behavior.Moreover, it analyzes empirically executives's characteristics's influence to over-investment behavior,and over-investment behavior's influence to the company's performance.Third,the paper analyzes empirically find whether companies's conrestriction mechanism influence executives's on-the-job consumption behavior,which finds the way to curb executives's on-the-job consumption behavior. At the same time,it finds free cash flow influences executives's on-the-job consumption behavior,and finds companies's conrestriction mechanism can restrict executives's on-the-job consumption behavior.And these findings provide the theoretic support to govern excessive executives's on-the-job consumption.Fourth, for the first time,the paper analyzes theoretically the executives's financial behavior which encroaches on the state-owned assets. Through the study, this paper expounds the connotation,the features and the specific ways, and also analyzes various encroaching effect and factors of executives's financial behavior which encroaches on the state-owned assets.Five, for the first time,the paper analyzes theoretically the executives's financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility and use actual case to verify it,even proposes some policy suggestions.Finally, The paper comes up with the ways to govern the executives's financial behavior.It suggests restricting the executives's financial behavior based on the motives of the agent and encouraging the executives's financial behavior based on the motives of the social responsibility.These measures will provide useful train of thought and theoretic foundation to corporate governance of the state-owned enterprises...