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Research On The Equity Incentive Utility In State-Controlled Listed Companies Of Our Country

Posted on:2010-01-04Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z W LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360308990002Subject:Financial engineering and risk management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Equity incentive for senior management was an efficient incentive mean that appeared in the high economic development phase in the economically advanced country, and was widely used for the long time. But there were no definite answers to the questions that whether equity incentive truly had the quality for the incentive validity under current capital market conditions in China. What relationship existed between holding shares of senior management and the corporate performance? How about the risk in the equity incentive of the state-controlled listed company? How to assess and prevent these risks? And which model to choose by the state-controlled listed company to enhance company's performance. All these hot issues are still needed continual quest and research by us.Under the guidance of the principal-agency theory, human capital theory, corporate governance theory and so on, this thesis made use of research methods such as the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis, quantitative and qualitative analysis, risk assessment based on vague mathematics to study the equity incentive utility, risk, model of the state-controlled listed company and so on.Study about the equity incentive utility of the state-controlled listed company. Based on the analyze of the equity incentive utility measures and use the utility of the state-controlled listed company as the measure index to examine the equity incentive utility, constructed the evaluation index of company performance and the relational model of equity incentive and company performance. At last the thesis used methods such as entropy, regression analysis and so on to conduct empirical analysis on the equity incentive and company performance. Draw conclusions as follows:①There existed nonlinear relationship between senior management shareholding ratio and company performance.②Combined theory existed between senior management shareholding ratio and company performance.③Company size has significant influence on company performance.④Company growth ability has significant influence on company performance.To enhance equity incentive utility in listed company: the thesis focused on risk management of equity incentive and establishing reasonable model of equtiy incentive.Study about enhancing risk management of equity incentive. The thesis identified the risk of equity incentive based on the theory and method of risk management; Used the risk evaluation method based on the ambiguity function to evaluate the probability and consequences of equity incentive risk happened, and put forward countermeasures of avoiding risk. Then established influence factor of internal risk model. At last, draw conclusions as follows:①The risk in the state-controlled listed companies can be divided into external risk and internal risk. External risk mainly includes policy risk, market risk and legal risk. Internal risk mainly includes moral risk, under excitation risk, operating risk and so on.②Policy risk and moral risk were main risk that the state-controlled listed company had faced. External risk was greater than internal risk. Ordered by the size of risk complex impact were: policy risk, moral risk, market risk, operating risk, under excitation risk and legal risk.③Response strength of senior management to the compensation intensity modulus, hard costs of senior management and observed index reflect the degree of senior management's great effort were internal risk influence factor that could be controlled.Study about establishing reasonable model of equity incentive. The thesis on the basis of analyzing the influence factor of equity incentive, constructed scientific and reasonable equity incentive model of state-controlled listed company. Draw conclusions as follows:①Incentive object: Senior managers that affect surplus profit of company and core technical employees should become the object of equity incentive.②Incentive methods: We can reduce negative effect of incentive that made by weak form efficiency in the market through linking various methods together, such as stock option, restricted shares and so on.③Allocation and quota of equity incentive: Consider salary factor and interest factor to determine reasonable proportion that equity incentive quota to total incentive quota. The incentive quota between three percent and five percent is raletive well.④Stock sources: Introduction stocks and counter purchase stocks are both feasible method. But introduction stock is better.⑤Funds sources: We can choose the method of self-raised and draw stimulus dollars at the same time.⑥Exercise price: reference time from the date of grant, exercise price is the higher of stock's fair market value from the date of grant and stock's average value one month before the date of grant. Exercise price can also upward floating in the form of relevant proportion on the basis of the higher.⑦Period of validity and exercise arrangements: To the senior mangers, the period of validity if eight to ten years. To the middle managers and technical backbones is three to seven years. Arrange the equity incentive plan in the form of exercise by stages at the same time.The thesis has twelve figures, eighty tables and one hundred and thirty-one references in total.
Keywords/Search Tags:State-controlled Listed Company, Equity Incentive, Equity Incentive Utility, Equity Incentive Risk, Equity Incentive Model
PDF Full Text Request
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