Research On Behavior Evolution Of Traffic Body In The Process Of Pedestrian Crossing

The mixed traffic flow which constists of pedestrian, vehicle and non-motor vehicle has a more obvious influence on urban traffic. Traffic body behavior is no lonjier the interference factor, but becomes dominant factors to influence urban traffic running state. It not only has vital theorical meaning but also has practical meaning to develop the entirely researches on the traffic subject behavior.The existing research results show that behavior characteristic, behavior simulation and behavior psychological reason of traffic body is focused and the evolution rule is less focused. The traditional traffic flow models can’t descript and explain the evolution rule sufficiently. It urgent needs a theory to explain behavior evolution processes and rulesThis dissertation selects traffic body behavior in the process of pedestrian crossing as study object based on complex adaptive system theory, evolution economic and evolution game theory. Behavior evolution is explored from the evolution perspective by introducing evolutionary analysis paradigm. This dissertation establishes the spatial evolution game model of pedestrian behavior, evolution game model of pedestrian and driver based on time delay function and asymmetric dynamic replication model of multi-group to explore the evolution rule of pedestrian, driver and traffic manager. Specific research conclusion and content are as follows.It is found that traffic body behavior has characteristic with self adaptive and dynamic evolution based on descripting traffic subject behavior system. The evolution mechanism of trffic body behavior is analyzed from the perspective of behavior convention, behavior evolution, social and cultural choice and behavior maintenance. Evolution mode of traffic body behavior is parsed from the angle of forced evolution, self learning evolution and the combination of forced evolution and self learning evolution.In the spatial evolution gamed model of pedestrian behavior, Agent theory and repeated game are integrated, decision function of pedestrian behavior is constructed and the pedestrian evolution mechasim of self-study and learn from each other is proposed. A lot of results can be found by studying evolution rules of behavior and the relationship between act in violation of regulations and traffic management or traffic penalty. Resluts are as follows. Fistly, penalty has a certain threshold; penalty amount has a greater effect than the strict enforcement of traffic management. Secondly.when sensitive to the facilities convenience.Thirdly, when the crossing facilities are poor, the crossing facilities are extremely inconvenient or very convenient, pedestrians aren’t pedestrian ignore the traffic management. Lastly, any two factors among crossing time of obeying rule, the average crossing time and adventure illegal pedestrian ratio have a positive correlation. It has negative relationship between adventure illegal pedestrian ratio and crossing failure time.In the evolution game model of pedestrian and driver based on time delay function, a long term evolutionary model is used to model the crossing behavior between the pedestrian and driver at signalized intersection. Research results not only show that the long term evolution aim is comity between vehicles and pedestrians but also reveal the average traffic safety and control standard of intersection. It is found that long term evolution routes for pedestrian and driver behavior can be optimized; comity behavior between pedestrian and driver can be procured and the efficiency of crossing the street can be improved by regulating parameters including pedestrian flow, vehicle flow, pedestrian speed and vehicle speed.In the asymmetric dynamic replication model of multi-group, the general behavior evolution rules of pedestrian, driver and traffic manager is discussed based on risk cognition and behavior choice. According to the analysis of evolution stable strategy, and Nash equilibrium mixed strategy and simulating behavior evolution factors, some results are as follows. Firstly, current system converges to a state that pedestrian and driver adopt illegal behavior and traffic manager supervise carefully. Secondly, the behavior evolution of pedestrian, driver and traffic manager has obvious path denpendence. Thirdly, evolutionary strategy equilibrium of pedestrian, driver and traffic manager not only relies on own revenue but also is affected by the other group revenue. Lastly, influence factors of traffic body behavior include stimulative factor and limiting factors. The evolution process of traffic body behavior is accomplished under the role of stimulative factor and limit factor.Innovation points of the research are as follows. Firstly, traditional hypothesis of traffic body behavior is abandoned. Traffic body behavior is embedded in the traffic environment using the research paradigm of evolution. The long term evolution of traffic body behavior in the process of pedestrian crossing is explored from view of traffic situation, behavioral adaptation and evolution and the emerging and reinforcement of traffic situation. Secondly, spatial evolution game model of pedestrian behavior is established basd on the hypothesis of learning person after behavior evolution of traffic subject behavior is parsed systematically. Lastly, asymmetric dynamic replication model of multi-group and evolution game model of between pedestrian and driver based on time delay function are established to study their behavior evolution rules based on their risk cognition and behavior choice.