Research On Pedestrian Crossing Decision-making Of Road Section Based On Game Theory

With the process of urbanization accelerating, urban travel demand continues to increase, resulting in the amount of traffic on the city roads will also increase to some extent, which conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles deepened gradually. Now the phenomenon of pedestrian crossing difficult is widespread in the city, pedestrians in the face of the wide path, continuous traffic flow, usually at a loss, it is difficult to cross the road. How to take effective measures to alleviate traffic conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles, improve pedestrian crossing difficult circumstances become a serious problem to be solved. Research on traffic participants’ street characteristic and their mutual dynamic relationship in order to find the reason of street traffic chaos, the development of relevant policies, optimizing management methods and set a reasonable crossing facilities across the street to solve difficult problems, improve the city’s fundamental transport system operational efficiency and service levels.Based on this, this paper, taking pedestrian crossing traffic entity of decisionmaking behavior as the main research content, from the perspective of game theory, doing a certain amount of research on decision-making behavior of pedestrians crossing the non-signal control sections crosswalk, both crossing behaviors’ research for traffic control and effective control of the behavior of pedestrians crossing the street and the driver’s behavior is of great significance.Thesis includes the following research areas: First, through field investigation, the characteristic of the pedestrian crossing the non-signal control sections to be analyzed, while across the street in the vehicles collaboration, pedestrians psychological characteristics, delays and risks to be addressed; Secondly, constructing the pedestrians and the driver’s game model on the basis of the analysis of the pedestrian crossing characteristic and the game theory description of vehicles and pedestrians crossing the street, the payoff matrix can be calculated with reference to the define for both the delay and risk of the past, the game can be solved, and analysis the equilibrium of the model. Use cumulative prospect theory to select the optimal strategy game model and an example is given that the model has better applicability. Finally, based on the delay time for pedestrians and vehicle drivers through the game to evolve long-term behavior modeling, studied pedestrians and vehicle drivers through the behavior of long-term evolution, to analyze the evolution of behavior through the equilibrium point, and simulated the sensitive factors that influence the behavior of evolution.